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INTRODUCTION**
In early December 2008, ninety-four states signed the Convention
on Cluster Munitions (“CCM”) in Oslo, Norway.1 The Convention
prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer
of Cluster Munitions (“CMs”)2, defined as “weapon[s] comprising
multiple explosive submunitions [(i.e., bomblets)] which are
dispensed from a container.”3

** The American University International Law Review would like to thank Aliyah
M. Philips, American University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidate
2012, for her assistance with the Hebrew language sources in this article.
1. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on Cluster Munitions
Signing Conference, http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_iv/iv_signing
conferece.html (last visited May 9, 2010). For a complete list of all signatories,
see Convention on Cluster Munitions, Ratifications and Signatures,
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_i/i_statessigning.html (last visited
May 9, 2010).
2. See Convention on Cluster Munitions art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 3,
2008, Doc. No. CCM/77, available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/
ENGLISHfinaltext.pdf [hereinafter CCM] (listing the general obligations of
signatories regarding cluster munitions). See generally Priya Pillai, Adoption of
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, ASIL INSIGHT, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.asil.org/insights081001.cfm (providing a brief overview of the
convention’s provisions).
3. Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an
Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 447, 451 (2007)
(defining submunitions as "munition[s] designed to be dispensed in multiple
quantities from a container and to detonate prior to, on, or after impact," and
discussing additional variations of the definition of CM in the absence of the
standard definition.); see also Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 2, art.
2(2) (“‘Cluster munition’ means a conventional munition that is designed to
disperse or release explosive submunitions.”).
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The Convention, which will enter into force on August 15, 2010
following the ratification of thirty countries by mid-February 2010 ,
is the culmination of the “Oslo Process,” under whose heading five
conferences were held between February 2007 (Oslo, Norway) and
May 2008 (Dublin, Ireland).4 While only forty-six states originally
agreed to launch the process and endorse the Oslo Declaration at the
first conference in February 2007,5 107 states ultimately adopted the
CCM at the last conference held in Dublin.6 Such agreement
apparently reflects a dramatic rise in the number of states believing
that the only guarantee for the prevention of the next humanitarian
crisis inflicted by this weapon is its total elimination.7 As Germany’s
Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier and the British Foreign Secretary
David Miliband wrote, the CCM “is one of the most significant
developments in the area of conventional arms control,” through
which “[w]e will be banning an entire category of weapons.”8
4. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Oslo Process, http://www.cluster
convention.org/pages/pages_vi/vib_osloprocess.html (last visited May 9, 2010)
(naming the locations of the other three conferences as Lima, Peru (May 2007),
Vienna, Austria (December 2007), and Wellington, New Zealand (February 2008),
and noting that there were also a number of regional meetings leading up to the
convention).
5. Id. At this meeting, the states committed to conclude an international
instrument by 2008 that, inter alia, prohibits the production and use of CMs and
establishes a framework for stockpile destruction. Declaration, Oslo Conf. on
Cluster Munitions, ¶ 1, (Feb. 23, 2007), available at http://www.clusterconvent
ion.org/downloadablefiles/Oslo%20DeclarationFeb07.pdf.
6. Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Adopting the Convention on
Cluster Munitions, http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_i/i_statesadop
ting.html (last visited May 9, 2010).
7. Cf. Dept. of Foreign Aff., Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster
Munitions, http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/ (last updated Nov. 21, 2008)
(describing the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ view of the participation in and the
reasoning for the convention). For a detailed overview and a personnel account of
this conference, see John Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won: Oslo
Treaty Negotiations Conclude in Dublin, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Summer 2008,
available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88jb.htm [hereinafter Borrie,
How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won], and The Road from Oslo: Emerging
International Efforts on Cluster Munitions, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Summer 2007,
available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd85/85olso.htm [hereinafter Borrie,
The Road from Oslo]. For the most comprehensive and updated overview of the
entire Oslo Process, see JOHN BORRIE, UNACCEPTABLE HARM: A HISTORY OF HOW
THE TREAT TO BAN CLUSTER MUNITIONS WAS WON (United Nations 2009).
8. David Miliband & Frank Walter Steinmeier, Towards a Safer World,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis

BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

426

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/14/2010 9:31 AM

[25:423

Yet, in that same year, 2007, another multilateral process emerged
over the issue of CMs; rather than ban CMs, the process’s final goal
was to regulate CMs—with all that entailed.9 In the face of the
international outcry on the absence of any legal restrictions on CMs
whatsoever,10 many major CM stockpilers and users continue to
assert that various restrictions could adequately address the need to
dramatically minimize the likely post-conflict harm associated with
such weapons.
According to its proponents, regulation should be accomplished
through a set of legally binding restrictions issued under the auspices
of the 1980 U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (“CCW”).11
This convention constituted a framework for the separate protocols
free/2008/dec/02/weaponstechnology-armstrade.
9. See Van Woudenburg, supra note 3, at 474 (detailing the proposal in the
Conventional Weapons Convention (“CCW”) by Germany for Protocol VI
regarding regulation of cluster munitions, which called for new standards, clear
restrictions, and ultimately the “replacement of present-day cluster munitions by a
new generation of area target munitions”). See generally MICHAEL MANDELBAUM,
THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BEFORE AND AFTER
HIROSHIMA 33-34 (1981) (describing classification issues regarding the regulation
of nuclear weapons as an analogy for the possible implications of the evolving
cultural restraints on the use of CMs); BRIAN RAPPERT, CONTROLLING THE
WEAPONS OF WAR: POLITICS, PERSUASION, AND THE PROHIBITION OF INHUMANITY
123-36 (2006) (analyzing issues that prohibition on weapons may cause,
particularly in the area of classification).
10. See, e.g., Hard Fought Landmine Victory Faces New Threat, BIRMINGHAM
POST, Sept. 19, 2007, at 11 (describing the need for an international regulation of
cluster munitions due to their popularity as weapons and their potential for deadly
destruction).
11. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523
[hereinafter CCW]. The treaty entered into full force Dec. 2, 1983, and as of May
2010, there were 111 parties to the CCW, some of which have not ratified all the
protocols, and five signatories. See, e.g., Peter Kolarov, CCW Secretariat, U.N.
Office for Disarmament Aff., The Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), presented at U.N. Regional
Seminar on Promoting the Universality of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) and its Annexed Protocols in South Asia, Southeast Asia and
South Pacific (UNRCPD) (Dec. 17-18, 2008) (detailing the number of states that
have signed on to the various protocols of the CCW).
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formulated regarding conventional weapons; as such, it is confined to
general provisions (e.g., its entry into force or scope)). It currently
comprises three initial protocols and two which were adopted later:
(I) Non-Detectable Fragments (by X-rays),12 (II) Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices
(amended in 1996),13 (III) Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons,14 (IV) Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
(adopted in 1995),15 and (V) Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War
(“ERW”) (adopted in 2003).16
A proposed draft text of Protocol VI on CMs (“Draft Protocol”)
includes prohibitions and restrictions on storage, destruction, and
transfer of CMs between countries but falls far short of the
prohibitions contained in the CCM.17 While no consensus was
reached on the Draft Protocol during the five CM sessions held by
the expert subsidiary body of the CCW, the Group of Governmental
Experts (“GGE”), the CCW States Parties, in their November 2008
annual meeting, decided to continue work into 2009 while setting
aside two 2009 GGE sessions to address the CM weapons issue.18
12. CCW, supra note 11, Protocol I.
13. See CCW, supra note 11, Protocol II (addressing the restriction of land
mines, booby traps and other weapons); see also CCW Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV) art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 [hereinafter CCW
Protocol IV] (amending Protocol II of the CCW).
14. See CCW, supra note 11, Protocol III (introducing the protocol for use of
incendiary devices and detailing the protection of civilians).
15. CCW Protocol IV, supra note 13.
16. Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, CCW/MSP/2003/3 (Nov. 28,
2003) [hereinafter CCW Protocol V].
17. Group of Governmetnal Experts of the Staets Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
[GGE-CCW], Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, CCW/MSP/2009/WP.1 (Oct.
21, 2009) [hereinafter GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions]. For a
critical review, article by article, of an earlier slightly modified version (July
2008), see HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH OBSERVATIONS ON THE
CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) DRAFT PROTOCOL ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS (2008), available at http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/
wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/observations-on-ccw-draft-prot-ii-082908.pdf
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OBSERVATIONS].
18. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report, ¶
34, CCW/MSP/2008/4 (Jan. 23, 2009); see also Jeff Abramson, CCW Fails to
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Nonetheless, no agreed text was completed even in 2009 and in their
November 2009 annual meeting, CCW State Parties decided to
continue negotiation in 2010.19
Irrespective of the identity of the conference’s participants, the
state that served as a catalyst, albeit inadvertently, for bringing CMs
to the forefront of the international arena most recently was Israel.20
Despite earlier moves toward banning CMs and the increasing call of
some CCW members to address the humanitarian problems
associated with the weapon in recent years,21 no significant steps
were expected to be taken at that time. However, the 2006 Second
Lebanon War, in which Israel extensively used CMs,22 prompted
states into action.
Naturally, Israel’s use of CMs attracted much attention due to the
harm done to South Lebanon’s civilians, as well as the required
clearance and risk-awareness activities.23 In contrast, the far reaching

Reach Cluster Munitions Pact, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2008, at 48
[hereinafter Abramson, CCW Fails to Reach Cluster Munitions Pact] (observing
that no consensus was reached in large part due to disagreements between CCM
supporters and CCW supporters).
19. After prolonged, futile discussions as to whether the State Parties were
negotiating a protocol or merely a proposal for protocol, it was agreed that the
GGE “will conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and report to the next
Meeting of the High Contracting Parties,” while two sessions were scheduled for
April 12-16, 2010 and August 30-September 3, 2010. See Meeting of the High
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report, ¶ 40, CCW/MSP/2009/5 (Nov.
20, 2009). As to the discussion itself, see Katherine Harrison, Landmine Action
Notes on CCW (Nov. 14, 2009) (unpublished Note, on file with author).
20. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israel Won't Prosecute for Use of Cluster Bombs
in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007, at A4 (reporting on Israel’s use of CMs in
the 2006 war with Hezbollah garnered the attention of a high ranking United
Nations official).
21. See Chris C. Sanders, Contending With Explosive Remnants of War, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1, 2004, at 16, 19 (summarizing the concerns of nongovernmental organizations with respect to CMs, including “not only . . .
unexploded ordnance, but also . . . the direct impact on civilian populations of the
cluster bombs that doe explode as they can lead to significant civilian casualties”).
22. See Wade Boese, Cluster Munitions Under New Scrutiny, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Oct. 1, 2006, at 38 (noting that unexploded CMs continued to harm people
even after the official end to the war).
23. See id. (detailing the impact of cluster munitions on civilians and the
locations of explosive remnants of war, and citing estimates that it would take up
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implications of Israel’s extensive use of the weapon, rooted mainly
in the theoretical dilemma distinguishing an absolute ban on CMs (as
advocated in the Oslo Process) from a “relative” ban (as formulated
in
the
CCW
process),
were
neglected.
This oversight was unfortunate given the 2008 release of two
important documents: Israel’s Inquiry Commission into the Second
Lebanon War (“Winograd Report”), which reviewed Israel’s use of
CMs and their legality ,24 and Israel Defense Force’s (“IDF”)
Military Advocate General’s (“MAG”) legal opinion on whether the
IDF’s extensive use of CM complied with international humanitarian
law (“IHL”).25
This article is divided into two sections. Part I provides a brief
historical record of past failed attempts to ban CMs. It also describes
Israel’s extensive CM use, as well as the resulting international
outcry and its impetus to the CCM’s formulation.26 Part II analyzes
the Winograd Report and the MAG’s legal opinion, from which it
gleans seven overlooked lessons regarding CMs’ legality, but mainly
to fifteen months to clear the unexploded CMs).
24. See COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE LEBANON CAMPAIGN IN 2006, THE
SECOND LEBANON WAR, FINAL REPORT (2008) [hereinafter WINOGRAD REPORT],
available at http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/reports.html#null. The unclassified
version of the Report was released in January 2008 and is known as the Winograd
Commission after its chairman, Justice (Ret.) Dr. Eliyahu Winograd. Other
members of the Commission include Law Professor Ruth Gavison, Political
Science Professor Yehezkel Dror, and IDF Generals (Reserves) Menachem Einan
and Chaim Nadel. It should be noted that in April 2007 the Commission issued a
lengthy Interim Report which focuses on other issues. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE
LEBANON CAMPAIGN IN 2006, THE SECOND LEBANON WAR, INTERIM REPORT
(2007), available at http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/reports.html#null [hereinafter
INTERIM REPORT].
25. See MAG, Brig. Gen. Avihai Mendelblit, Main Points of MAG's Legal
Opinion for Inquiring Officer over the Circumstance of Employing Cluster
Munitions during the Second Lebanon War, June 18, 2008 (on file with author)
[hereinafter MAG’s Legal Opinion]. The opinion was written in September 2007
and partially declassified in June 2008. Although it was released on September 6,
2007, the public learned of this important instrument only in December 2007. At
the time, the MAG refused to release even an unclassified version despite repeated
requests by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (“ACRI”). Only on June 18,
2008, six months after the ACRI's first appeal on January 9, 2008, was a segment
of the document—thirteen out of thirty pages in the classified version—released.
Telephone Interview with Adv. Dan Yakir, Chief Legal Counsel, Association for
Civil Rights in Israel (July 13, 2008).
26. See infra Part I.
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the CCM’s necessity vis-à-vis the likely effectiveness of the CMs
Draft Protocol under the CCW.27
As these lessons suggest, none of the restrictions as proposed in
the Draft Protocol could ensure that a humanitarian crisis such as that
observed in South Lebanon would not recur. On the contrary, as this
article suggests, future use of CMs in armed conflicts under the Draft
Protocol or any other would-be legal instrument regulating their use
may in fact accelerate and/or encourage use. Therefore, when
considering the theoretical dilemma pitting the banning model
against the regulation model, Israel’s experience seems to support the
first option. As the 2006 War strongly suggests, when it comes to
restraining the use of the CM weapon in a bitter conflict, no state is
to be trusted.

I. SETTING: THE SECOND LEBANON WAR AND
THE EMERGENCE OF THE CCM
A. PAST ATTEMPTS TO BAN CMS
Contrary to common assumptions, CMs predate not only the
Vietnam War, but also WWII.28 Various types of air-dropped CMs,
as defined in the CCM,29 were already in use in WWI.30

27. See infra Part II.
28. See Woudenberg, supra note 3, at 447 (noting that the first CMs were first
used by Germany in WWII); see also Alexander Breitegger, Preventing Human
Suffering During and After Conflict? The Complementary Case for a Specific
Convention on Cluster Munitions, in 10 AUSTRIAN REV. OF INT’L & EUR. L. 3, 7-8
(Gerhard Loibl & Stephan Wittich eds., 2005) (suggesting that past “military
excesses” served as catalysts for advancing international law on CMs).
29. CCM, supra note 2, art. 2(2). But see Van Woudenberg, supra note 3, at
454 (highlighting that there is no uniform definition of cluster munition). For an
analysis of the implications of the definition of CMs within the Oslo Negotiations,
see Brian Rappert & Richard Moyes, The Prohibition of Cluster Munitions: Setting
International Precedents for Defining Inhumanity, 16 NONPROLIFERATION REV.
237, 246-47 (2009).
30. See WOLFGANG FLEISCHER, GERMAN AIR-DROPPED WEAPONS TO 1945, at
15, 141 (Ted Oliver trans., 2004) (documenting the specifications of the
Splitterbombe SD-2, which was used by the German Air Force as an antipersonnel device and contained either thirty-two or forty-two bombs). See
generally Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the
Law of War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 234-39 (2001) (providing a succinct overview of
the history of cluster munitions).
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Nevertheless, as noted by Professor Kalshoven, the Vietnam War,
“more than anything else prompted [the international community’s]
renewed interest in an almost forgotten topic,” namely the question
of banning use of specific weapons.31 U.S. use of CMs, which were
crowned as “[t]he most indiscriminate and lethal area weapon[s]
developed for the Vietnam War,” provoked considerable public
opposition.32 In fact, when South Vietnam used CMs (CBU-55)
against North Vietnam’s invading army, the latter issued a stern
warning and threatened that the army pilots deploying these weapons
would be charged with war crimes.33
When the international community began debating application of
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of various conventional
weapons in the 1970s, antipersonnel fragmentation CMs were among
the few weapons to become the target of proposals for categorical
prohibitions under what was to become the CCW.34 However, major
31. FRITS KALSHOVEN, ARMS, ARMAMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 225
(1985).
32. Michael Krepon, Blanket Coverage: Two Case Studies of Area Weapons in
Indochina, in THE WORLD MILITARY ORDER: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY ON THE THIRD WORLD 49, 56 (Mary Kaldor & Asbjørn Eide eds.,
1979). See generally ERIC PROKOSCH, THE TECHNOLOGY OF KILLING: A MILITARY
AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS, 83-105 (1995) (providing
a historical account of the use of various types of cluster bombs in Vietnam and
subsequent investigations). The concern aroused by the weapons’ use is evidenced
by the amount of testimony regarding them in the 1967 proceedings before the
International War Crimes Tribunal. Technical Aspects of Fragmentation Bombs
Testimony by Jean Pierre Vidier, M.D., in AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL 249, 249-58 (John
Duffett ed., 1968).
33. Antonio Cassese, Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare
(1977), in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 170 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1980). The warning was issued in April 1975. The North Vietnamese
claims were based on the “inhumane” and “indiscriminate” nature of the weapons,
which they declared as “contrary to international law” and responsible for
terrorizing the civilian population. Id. at 161, 172 & n.39.
34. See Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974), U.N. Doc.
CDDH/DT/2 (Feb. 21, 1974) (listing the weapons which were the subject of
proposals for outright bans). The proposals, which were supported by Egypt,
Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Sudan, also included bans
against incendiary weapons, multiple flechette weapons, and especially injurious
small-caliber projectiles. A slightly amended draft, ultimately supported by
sixteen states, was submitted in 1975.
Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
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military powers, particularly the United States and its allies, opposed
any proposal to restrict, let alone ban, the use of CMs.35 The need for
consensus with respect to adding a new protocol forestalled
acceptance of any meaningful weapons prohibitions and ensured that
no restrictions on CMs would apply.36
The concern provoked by subsequent large-scale use of CMs in
armed conflicts that attracted international attention, such as the 1999
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia,37 was unable to fundamentally change the situation but it
was enough to lead to the 2003 adoption of Protocol V to the CCW
on ERW. Following the high rate of civilian casualties in Kosovo—
mainly from CM duds—the International Committee of the Red
Cross (“ICRC”) “called for a moratorium” on CM use “pending the
adoption of rules on ERW,” a call which initiated eight years of
discussions.38

Armed Conflicts, Vol. XVI, Geneva, Switz., 1974-1977, Incendiary Weapons,
U.N. Doc. CDDH/IV/201.
35. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Move by U.S., Others to Support Cluster Munitions
Fails, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2006, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/
2008/11/14/move-us-others-support-cluster-munitions-fails (reporting that the
United States and other countries in fact pushed a protocol that “would allow the
use of all existing cluster munitions, including the oldest, most inaccurate, and
unreliable varieties, for a period of up to 20 years”).
36. See id. (indicating that the CCW operates only by consensus and that about
twenty-five countries opposed the draft text).
37. See, e.g., Hundreds March Against Airstrikes, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at
3B (describing protests against the NATO bombings); Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1264-65
(2000) (showing that concern over the bombings was significant enough to require
an investigation into pursuing possible prosecution). For criticism on the decision
to refrain from investigating possible war crimes (including the attack with CMs
on Niš, the third-largest city in Serbia) see Anne-Sophie Massa, The Decision of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Not To Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion?, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 610, 633 (2006).
38. See Louis Maresca, A New Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War: The
History and Negotiation of Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 815, 817-18 (2004) (relating the
details of an ICRC study, which found that more civilians died from CMs than
from landmines); see also Van Woudenberg, supra note 3, 468-76 (tracking the
progress of ICRC and CCW discussions on CM regulation).
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However, the Protocol on ERW, in force since November 2006,
fails to directly address the dangers of CMs; instead, it focuses on
post-conflict requirements, and its provisions suffer from an overabundance of ambiguities and weak, qualifying language to the point
where few, if any, obligations are binding.39 Furthermore, even
during the negotiations, various states as well as international and
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) did not regard as
adequate a protocol dealing only with post-conflict situations.40 As
such, the ERW problem remains on the agenda with the GGE
working according to its original mandate (2003), which mentions
CMs only indirectly.41
Therefore, when the CCW Third Review Conference convened in
November 2006, CMs were not on the agenda and it was doubted
whether they would attract much attention.42 But in the aftermath of
the Second Lebanon War, the CM issue—with strong
“encouragement from the ICRC”43 as well as the Cluster Munition

39. See Peter Herby & Anna Nuiten, Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting
Civilians through an Additional Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, 83 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 195 (2001) (analyzing Protocol
V, which delineates the responsibilities of states to clean up unexploded or
abandoned munitions after the end of hostilities).
40. See Van Woudenberg, supra note 3, 477 (indicating that the Oslo Initiative
was created as a call to stricter regulation of cluster munitions than that which was
provided by the CCW’s protocol).
41. See Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 18-19, 2004,
Report of the Meeting of the States Parties, at 4, CCW/MSP/2004/2 (Dec. 13,
2004) (stating that the work of the GGE on ERW would continue into 2005); see
also Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 24-25, 2006, Report
of the Meeting of the States Parties, at 5, CCW/MSP/2005/2 (Feb. 14, 2006)
(stipulating that the work of the GGE on ERW would continue into 2006).
42. See Borrie, The Road from Oslo, supra note 7, at 46 (describing the lack of
attention cluster munition regulation received in the CCW after 2003).
43. Id. at 47 (describing cluster munition regulations being the focus after the
Lebanon War). The ICRC was shocked by Israel's extensive use of CMs, and the
ICRC's Director for International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri, later stated
"[the] density of cluster submunition contamination may be unprecedented." U.N.
INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RES., THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF CLUSTER
MUNITIONS 30 (2008) [hereinafter UNIDIR REPORT].
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Coalition (“CMC”)44—secured a high place on the agenda. The
issue’s importance was well reflected in the then U.N. Secretary
General (“UNSG”) Kofi Annan’s call for a “freeze” on CM use in
populated areas, together with the destruction of inaccurate and
unreliable CMs.45 Led by Norway, twenty-five states called to ban
CMs “that pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for
example unreliable and/or inaccurate.”46 As expected, this
declaration did not achieve a consensus. Ultimately, experts
convened in June 2007 to further consider the application and
implementation of existing IHL “to specific munitions that may
cause explosive remnants of war, with particular focus on cluster
munitions.”47
In a June 2007 meeting, Germany submitted a draft Protocol VI on
CMs.48 Concurrently, the United States, contrary to its traditional
policy, declared its willingness to begin negotiations on a Protocol to
restrict CM use “but not a ban on the weapons.”49 As observers
44. See
Cluster
Munition
Coal.,
The
Problem,
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem/ (last visited May 12, 2010).
The CMC—a group of around three hundred NGOs from more than eighty
countries—was formed after the 2003 Dublin Conference on ERW. It is active in
campaigning for a ban on CMs similar to the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (“ICBL”). See id. (providing background information on the CMC).
45. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-General, U.N. Office at Geneva, The
Secretary General’s Message to Third Review Conference of the Convention on
Certain
Conventional
Weapons,
Nov.
7,
2006,
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2289.
46. Third Rev. Conf. of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Nov. 7-17, 2006, Documents of the Third Review Conference, at 41,
CCW/CONF.III/11 (Part III).
47. Third Rev. Conf. of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Nov. 7-17, 2006, Final Declaration, at 6, CCW/CONF.III/11 (Part II).
48. GGE-CCW, June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW Protocol on Cluster Munitions,
annex, CCW/GGE/2007/WP.1 (May 1, 2007) (submitted by Germany); see also
GGE-CCW, June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW Negotiating Mandate on Cluster
Munitions, at ¶ 1, CCW/GGE/2007/WP.3 (June 1, 2007) (submitted by Germany
on Behalf of the European Union) (introducing a draft mandate to begin
negotiations on Protocol VI).
49. See John Zarocostas, U.S. Eyes Limits on 'Cluster' Weapons; but Refuses
Ban on the Bombs, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at A11 (noting that the United
States had changed its position after an “internal review” and after considering the
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speculated, the U.S. change was “intended to prevent mass
defections to an ‘Oslo Treaty.’”50 At the 2007 CCW States Parties’
annual meeting, a consensus was achieved to “negotiate a proposal to
address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while
striking a balance between military and humanitarian
considerations.”51 In truth, some major CM users and stockpilers,
especially Russia, do not support the proposed Protocol.52 Other
countries, such as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which
shunned the Oslo Process, shared views similar to Russia’s.
However, given the importance that the United States attached to the
Protocol, those same states are paying lip service to the Oslo
Process.53
Yet, despite five sessions of the GGE held throughout 2008,
during which major CM stockpilers, but mainly the United States,
worked to gain wide support for drafting a sixth protocol on CMs,
states were unable to agree upon the text.54 In its subsequent
humanitarian concerns associated with using cluster munitions).
50. See Borrie, The Road from Oslo, supra note 7, 51-52. As Borrie suggested
in another piece, the United States was aware that "it would be politically difficult
for supporters of the Oslo Process to appear to reject a CCW negotiating mandate
on cluster munitions." Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won, supra
note 7.
51. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 7-13,
2007, Report, at 9, CCW/MSP/2007/5 (Dec. 3, 2007).
52. See Miles A. Pomper, Cluster Munitions Talks Gain Steam, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 2008, at 52 (noting that Russia is reluctant to support the
Protocol because it is “too expensive and technologically demanding”).
53. See Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won, supra note 7, at 51-52
(listing “core” Oslo Process supporters as Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, and Peru); E-mail from John Borrie, Senior Research &
Project Manager at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, to
Eitan Barak, Professor of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Dec. 15,
2008, 21:39 CET) (on file with author); cf. Dr. Rodica Radian Gordon, Dir. of
Arms Control Dep’t, Israel Ministry of For. Aff., Explanation of the Vote at
Convention
on
Cluster
Munitions
(L.56),
available
at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com08/EOV/IsraelL56.pdf
(explaining Israel’s view that the CCW is the best and most promising place to
deal with cluster munition regulation).
54. Cf. Stephen Mathias, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Meeting of States
Parties to Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), U.S. Delegation
Statement on the Work of the GGE (Nov. 13, 2008), available at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2008/11/13/gge/ (expressing the disappointment of the
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November 2008 annual meeting, the CCW States Parties agreed to
continue their negotiations on “proposals,”55 while setting aside two
2009 GGE sessions to address CM weapons. 56
As of mid 2007, as many as thirty-two states were known to have
produced more than two hundred different types of CM; furthermore,
some seventy-five armies worldwide include this weapon in their
arsenals.57 Therefore, as the chairman of the GGE on CMs
commented: “I hope that everybody will keep in mind that 90
percent of world stockpiles are not covered by the CCM.”58
Indeed, as statements from countries attending the Dublin
conference and/or the Oslo signing conference show, some states
have already begun to remove CMs from service.59 Yet, the
challenge the CCM faces vis-à-vis achievement of universal
U.S. delegation regarding the lack of consensus on the new protocol).
55. See Abramson, CCW Fails to Reach Cluster Munitions Pact, supra note 18,
at 48 (“Russia objected to using the word ‘protocol’ if . . . work were to
continue.”).
56. See Posting of John Borrie to Disarmament Insight, CCW: The Wailing
Wall
(Nov.
7,
2008,
15:15
EST),
http://disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com/2008/11/ccw-wailing-wall.html (reporting
that 25 CCW State Parties, mainly strong supporters of the Oslo Process, issued a
joint statement concerning opposition to the protocol). But see Stephen Mathias,
U.S. Delegation Statement on Proposed Changes by Group of 25, Nov. 7, 2008,
available at
http://www.us-mission.ch/ccw/statements/1107Group25.html
(reiterating U.S. opposition to a complete ban on CMs); see also Meeting of the
High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report, ¶ 34, CCW/MSP/2008/4 (Jan.
23, 2009) (reporting the final decision).
57. See Women’s Int’l League for Peace and Freedom, 32 Countries that
Produce Cluster Munitions, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermuniti
ons/producers.html (last updated Nov. 2007) (listing countries that have produced
cluster munitions); see also Hum. Rts. Watch, A Dirty Dozen Cluster Munitions,
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/clusters/chart/ (last visited May 13, 2010)
(listing stockpiling countries).
58. Jeff Abramson, CCW Considers Limits on Cluster Munitions, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2008, at 43 [hereinafter Abramson, CCW Considers Limits
on Cluster Munitions]. (failing to give any evidential basis for the high figure).
59. See, e.g., Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Fed. Minister for For. Aff., Speech at
the Signing Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo (Mar. 12,
2008) (stating that Germany had decided to destroy its cluster munitions prior to
the conference); Maxime Verhagen, Minister of For. Aff., Speech at Signing
Conference, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Oslo (Dec. 3, 2008) (indicating that
the Netherlands had already begun destruction of its cluster munitions).
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adherence is far more challenging than the one faced by its
predecessor, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel (“AP”)
Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Convention”).60 Unlike AP
mines, CMs are perceived by modern militaries as an effective and
indispensable weapon.61 Indeed, as stated U.S. Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates when announcing a new U.S. policy on CMs in June
2008, “[c]luster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military
utility. They are effective weapons, provide distinct advantages
against a range of targets . . . and are an integral part of U.S. forces
capabilities.”62

B. ISRAEL’S EXTENSIVE USE OF CMS
Given the 2006 Second Lebanon War’s limited geographical
boundaries and short duration (34 days), Israel fired an
unprecedented quantity of CMs.63 In addition to the small-scale use
of indigenous M85 bomblets,64 there was extensive use of U.S.-made
60. United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sep.
18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 36 I.L.M. 1507.
61. Cf. Robert G. Gard, Jr., The Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines, in TO
WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES 136, 138-54
(Maxwell A. Cameron et al. eds., 1999) (providing information on the limited
military utility attributed to AP mines and their banning, but acknowledging that
many states have an interest in continuing to use them).
62. Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military
Depts. et al. (June 19, 2008). In principle, the new policy sets the goal of using
CMs with less than one percent HDR within the next ten years. See id. (indicating
the time frame and policy for the Department of Defense concerning HDR).
63. See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON: ISRAEL’S
USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON IN JULY AND AUGUST 2006 (2008)
[hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON] (analyzing the use of
cluster munitions by Israel and the impact they had on Lebanon and its people).
64. See id. at 32 (describing the types of cluster munitions used by Israel in the
Lebanon War). Each M395 and M396 155mm artillery shell contains and delivers
sixty-three and forty-nine M85 bomblets, respectively. Id. at 30. Additionally,
some 130 Israeli-made Trajectory Correction System (“TCS”) rockets were first
operational in this war. Id. at 32; see also Press Release, Israel Mil. Industries,
IMI’s Trajectory Corrected Rocket Operated and Combat Proven in the 2nd
Lebanon War (May 15, 2007) (describing the TCS rocket’s capabilities and the use
by Israel during the war). The TCS rockets have a content of 644 M77 bomblets.
Data presented to the author at the IMI exhibit marking Israel’s 60th anniversary,
Rishon LeZion, Sept. 16-23, 2008; see also Amnon Barzilai, A Precise Rocket for
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CMs, delivered by U.S.-made 155mm artillery shells, Multiple
Launch Rocket System’s (“MLRS”) M26 rockets, and—albeit on a
limited scale—Vietnam-era aerially delivered CBU-58B bombs.65 As
more than 1,800 rockets were fired on Lebanon—each rocket
containing 644 bomblets—more than 1.2 million cluster bombs were
dispersed from this weapon system alone.66 According to official
reports, the MLRS bomblets’ high dynamic range’s (“HDR”) ranges
from 5% – 23%, implying that between 58,000 to 253,000 MLRS
bomblets failed in Southern Lebanon.67 Given the official failure rate
of 3% – 14%, artillery-delivered CMs and a careful estimate of the
number of U.S.-made shells used, the conclusion to be reached is that
some additional 21,000 failed bomblets are expected to be found
somewhere in Lebanon.68
40 km- for the IDF Use, HAARETZ, Aug. 17, 2004, at 6. Haaretz has published a
concise English-language edition (also available online) as of September 1997.
Citations were taken from this source whenever possible to avoid translation
errors. Unless otherwise indicated, Hebrew sources were translated by the author.
65. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 2832 (describing the types of cluster munitions used by Israel that were partially
made by the United States). No exact data are available for the number of airdropped CMs (CBU-58B with 650 bomblets each) used, but as of mid-January
2008, 28,136 duds BLU-63 bomblets from the 2006 War were found; these
constitute 20% of the total number of duds destroyed by the deminers. Id. at 32.
66. Meron Rapoport, When Rockets and Phosphorous Cluster, HAARETZ, Sep.
13, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/761910.html; see
also AMIR RAPAPORT, FRIENDLY FIRE 344 (2007).
67. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:
THE
M26
ROCKET
(2006),
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/18/global14050.htm
(providing
a
general overview of M26 rocket use in Lebanon). However, while the Human
Rights Watch report cites official reports according to which the HDR is as high as
16%, some U.S. official reports note significantly higher HDRS. See, e.g., U.S.
GEN. ACCT. OFF. [GAO], OPERATION DESERT STORM: CASUALTIES CAUSED BY
IMPROPER HANDLING OF UNEXPLODED U.S. SUBMUNITIONS 4 (1993) (relaying an
HDR rate as high as 23%).
68. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 29
& n.66 (aggregating data on failure rates from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense, the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). Although no
official data are available, relying on artillerists' eyewitness accounts, it is clear
that no more than five percent of the used shells delivered CMs (i.e., some 8,500
shells) from which a small part (assuming some 2,500 shells) were Israeli-made
shells having a lower number of bomblets (each U.S.-made artillery shell contains
88 bomblets). As such, up to 685,500 bomblets were delivered by artillery shells.
See Hanan Greenberg, IDF: Use of Cluster Bombs During War Legal,
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In sum, even given the HDR’s lowest estimates of all CMs in use,
the IDF commanders who executed the firing of these munitions
knew in advance that a total of 79,000 duds would remain on
Lebanese soil.69 However, low official HDRs, as acknowledged by
the Winograd Commission,70 were proven to be unreliable.
Therefore, the actual number of duds in South Lebanon is much
higher and reflected in the high number of duds found so far as
compared to the maximum number of 79,000 duds expected
according to the official HDRs.71 This number is, of course, far from
the million duds (among four million used bomblets) estimated by
the United Nations.72 As the U.S. State Department rightly pointed

YNETNEWS.COM, Dec. 24, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3486267,00.html.
69. The number of duds to be expected from the aerially delivered CM BLU-63
bomblets, which have a declared HDR of five percent, is excluded from our
calculation. Nonetheless, the fact that the some 2,500 Israeli–made shells have
fewer bomblets offsets this exclusion.
70. See infra, Part II, Lesson 1.
71. Cf. GENEVA INT’L CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING, GUIDE TO
CLUSTER MUNITIONS 20 (2d ed. 2009) (indicating that as of December 2008, a
total number of 153,755 duds had been found in Lebanon). However, the actual
figure is higher, as no figures contain accurate estimates of the large numbers of
unexploded sub-munitions cleared by local villagers or during undocumented
emergency clearance by the Lebanese Armed Forces (“LAF”) and the U.N. Interim
Force in Lebanon (“UNIFIL”), conducted after large numbers of sub-munitions
were found on in populated areas. Cf. HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH
LEBANON, supra note 63, at 82-90 (describing the cleanup efforts of failed
submunitions in Lebanon).
72. See, e.g., Michael Slackman, Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A1 (“[S]outhern Lebanon is littered with one million
unexploded bomblets, far outnumbering the 650,000 people living in the region.”).
The estimate was provided by MAAC-SL, which had relied on a press report
stating that 160,000 shells were fired and that an estimated 10%–20% of these (i.e.,
16,000 to 32,000 shells) delivered U.S.-made CMs. Hence, a total of
approximately 1.4 to 2.8 million bomblets were fired by Israel. See U.N. MINE
ACTION COORDINATION CTR., SOUTH LEBANON CLUSTER BOMB INFORMATION
SHEET 2, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?
openagent&shortid=EKOI-74B5B5&file=Full_Report.pdf (providing data on the
amount of unexploded cluster munitions). To those figures, the U.N. Mine Action
Coordination Center South Lebanon (“MACC-SL”) added the 1,159,200 MLRS
bomblets. Id.; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note
63, at 37 (providing a reproduction of this calculation by NGOs dated as late as
January 2008).
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out, given the rate of clearance, the actual number of duds found
does not support such a high estimate.73

C. THE INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY AND THE CCM’S
EMERGENCE
Although few accusations appeared in the international media
claiming Israel’s use of CMs was illegal74 amidst the intense fighting,
the world’s outcry was raised in the war’s aftermath; Israel suddenly
found itself under heavy attack.75 Israel was publicly condemned
even by then UNSG Annan, while then Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator, Under-Secretary-General Jan
Egeland, Annan’s aide, chose to focus his criticism on the fact that
“90 percent of the cluster bomb strikes occurred in the last 72 hours
of the conflict, when we knew there would be a resolution.”76 Israel’s
73. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Pol.-Mil. Aff., White Paper: Putting the
Impact of Cluster Munitions in Context with the Effects of All Explosive
Remnants of War, Fact Sheet (Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=36f73dda-59a2-4755-9f50a2e006592343 [hereinafter U.S. White Paper] (providing results of U.S. efforts to
destroy conventional munitions in other countries). However, it was stressed that
this should not be construed as stating that the duds did not “create[] a significant
humanitarian impact in southern Lebanon." Id.
74. But see Press Release, Human Rts. Watch, Israeli Cluster Munitions Hit
Civilians in Lebanon: Israel Must Not Use Indiscriminate Weapons (July 24,
2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/24/isrlpa13798_txt.htm (opining that
cluster munitions violate international humanitarian law); Robert Pear, Rally Near
White House Protests Violence in Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at A22
(detailing protests in the United States in reaction to Israel’s bombing of Lebanon).
75. See Marvin Kalb & Carol Saivetz, The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The
Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict, 12 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL.,
Summer 2007, at 43, 50-51 (describing views of both the news media and the
public as highly critical of Israel’s bombing of Lebanon). This was part of a
general trend among leading U.S. newspaper pages, the front pages of which
“Israel was portrayed as the aggressor.” Id. at 51 (comparing the view of common
newspapers towards Israel with their view of Hezbollah).
76. See THOMAS NASH, FORESEEABLE HARM: THE USE AND IMPACT OF
CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 3 (2006) (quoting Egeland as describing Israel’s
use of CMs as “shocking and “completely immoral”). This information led many
Lebanese to believe that Israel's intention was "to litter the south with unexploded
cluster bombs as a strategy to keep people from returning right away." Slackman,
supra note 72; see also, e.g., Yoav Stern, Annan Condemns IDF Use of Cluster
Bombs, HAARETZ, Sept. 1, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=757515&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubCon
trassID=0 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (criticizing IDF policy); Todd Pitman,
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actions likewise drew heavy criticism in the four U.N. Human Rights
Council (“UNHRC”) Rapporteurs’ report following their fact-finding
mission to Lebanon and Israel in September 2006.77 The report led
the Human Rights Council to establish a special U.N. Commission of
Inquiry (“COI”) to investigate violations of human rights and
humanitarian law by Israel, which produced the Report of November
2006, which in turn reinforced and intensified that criticism.78 Most
importantly, as both reports concluded, the international community
should take “urgent action to add cluster munitions to the list of
weapons banned under international law.”79
Naturally, the harm to South Lebanon’s civilians as well as the
required clearance and risk awareness activities attracted much
attention by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) and
Landmine Action.80 Their reports, which were issued mainly by the
Unexploded Israeli bombs Menace Lebanese, FOX NEWS, Aug. 31, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2006Aug31/0,4675,MideastClust
erBombsLH1,00.html (describing the outcry of officials over the use of the bombs
by Israel but indicating they were not used illegally); cf. Michael L. Gross, The
Second Lebanon War: The Question of Proportionality and the Prospect of NonLethal Warfare, 7 J. MIL. ETHICS 1 (2008) (analyzing the effect that Israel’s strike
at the end of the war had on the proportionality question).
77. See Mission to Lebanon and Israel, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, the Special
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, the Representative of the
Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter
Kälin, and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari, delivered to the U.N.
Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/7 (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter UNHRC
Report]. After criticizing Israel's extensive use of CMs and raising doubts over
their military necessity, the U.N. Rapporteurs noted that "[i]f proven, the widely
reported claim . . . would indicate an intention to inhibit and prevent the return of
civilians and a reckless disregard for the predictable civilian casualties that have
occurred.” Id. at 10, 13, 25.
78. See id. at 58-60 (criticizing Israel’s extensive and unnecessary use of the
cluster munition).
79. UNHRC REPORT, supra note 77, at 24-25.
80. See, e.g., NASH, supra note 76, at 34 (documenting the involvement of the
MACC-SL and the Mine Advisory Group); HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH
LEBANON, supra note 63; GREG CROWTHER, COUNTING THE COST: THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION IN LEBANON (2008) (providing
Landmine Action’s report on the economic consequences of the cluster munition
use by Israel); see also UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 43; CATHY SULTAN,
TRAGEDY IN SOUTH LEBANON: THE ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR OF 2006 59-72
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NGOs participating in the CMC as of 2006, have helped sustain the
problematic implications in the public mind associated with CM use
in the 2006 War.81
Therefore, in spite of earlier developments toward banning CMs,
including domestic measures such as the February 2006 Belgium
National Legislation prohibiting CM manufacture, trade, and
deployment,82—the first of its kind internationally—for many experts
and CMC activists, Israel’s use ensured that the campaign to ban
CMs would receive universal support.83 Even those experts and CMC
activists who refused to perceive this use sine qua non for the CCM’s
emergence admit it was crucial for creating the strong convention,
signed by many countries.84 As Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s Foreign
Minister clearly stated in October 2006, “[t]he case of Lebanon
clearly demonstrates that there is a real need to strengthen
humanitarian law in this area . . . . This is why Norway will take the
lead . . . to put in place an international prohibition against cluster
munitions.”85 Indeed, a month later, when the 2006 CCW Third
(2008) (criticizing Israel’s use of cluster munitions in Lebanon).
81. Cf. HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 117
(characterizing cluster munitions as illegal and stating that, in light of the conflict
with Lebanon, states should immediately ban their use). As expected, although
covering various and different aspects, a rather common trait of them was a harsh
criticism on Israel as well as a call for banning CMs or severely restricting their
use. For example, as HRW concluded in its February 2008 report, "[t]hese factors
lead us to conclude [sic] Israel’s attacks were indiscriminate and disproportionate,
and thus illegal under international humanitarian law.” Id.
82. 176 Belgian Bulletin of Acts and Decrees, no. 184, June 9, 2006 (3d ed.).
According to Richard Moyes, one of the three Co-Chairs of the CMC, the
legislation played a key role in the Oslo Process's emergence by changing the
dynamics. E-mail from Richard Moyes, Policy & Research Director at Action on
Armed Violence, to Eitan Barak (Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with author).
83. Cf. Walter Gibbs & Kirk Semple, Afghanistan Agrees to Sign Bomb Treaty,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A17 (describing Israel’s positive effect on convincing
states to sign the cluster munitions treaty, focusing specifically on Afghanistan).
As the 1997 Nobel peace Laureate Jody Williams said during the Oslo Signing
Ceremony: “Quite frankly, if Israel hadn’t done that, we might not have a cluster
treaty today.” Id.
84. As prominent CMC activists (e.g., two of its co-chairs, Moyes and HRW's
Arms Division Director Steve Goose summed it up, Lebanon was "necessary, but
not sufficient," emphasizing that multilateral processes were already underway.
See E-mail from Richard Moyes, supra note 82; E-mail from John Borrie, supra
note 53.
85. Gibbs & Semple, supra note 83; see also J. Gahr Store, Cluster Munitions,
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Review Conference convened, Norway attempted to ban CMs under
this framework. Once realizing, however, that its attempts are
doomed to failure, much to the U.S.’s displeasure,86 Støre announced
Norway’s intention to organize a conference for like-minded
governments seeking to ban CMs.87 From this point, the road to the
Signing Conference was unavoidable.

II: THE WINOGRAD REPORT, THE IDF MAG’S
LEGAL OPINION AND THE CASE FOR THE CCM
On September 26, 2006, nine days after the Winograd
Commission was appointed by the Israeli Government in response to
massive domestic pressures “[t]o look into the preparation and
conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the
dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12,
2006,”88 the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (“ACRI”)
requested assurance that “the committee’s mandate include an
investigation of alleged grave violations of humanitarian law,”
including the use of CMs “in the heart of built-up areas.”89 Such a
practice, the ACRI stated in its appeal, “represents a blatant violation
of humanitarian law, both because this weaponry cannot be
4 DISARMAMENT FORUM 3, 3 (2006) (indicating his view that cluster munitions
should be banned via legally binding regulations).
86. Stephen D. Goose, Cluster Munitions: Ban Them, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 6, 6, 8 (stating that Norway led a process to ban cluster
munitions, and summarizing the U.S. opposition to a possible ban on CMs); U.S.
White Paper, supra note 73 (supporting the CCW Protocol V and encouraging
other states to support the Protocol, as well); Doug Tuttle, U.S. Cluster Munitions
Policy,
CTR.
FOR
DEF.
INFO.,
Feb.
22,
2008,
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4216 (“In [its White
Paper], the United States clearly outlines its unwillingness to join the international
effort to ban cluster bombs.”).
87. Associated Press, Norway Leads Move to Ban Cluster Bombs Despite
Objections of U.S., FOX NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,230278,00.html.
88. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 35, ¶ 14. The commission was
appointed under Basic Law: The Government, 2001, § 7(a) (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic14_eng.htm (last visited May 14,
2010) (designating to a Knesset Member the power to form the government body).
89. Letter from Dan Yakir, ACRI Chief Legal Counsel & Sonia Boulos,
Attorney, to Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, Head of the Government Appointed
Investigative Committee, Prime Minister’s Office (Sep. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.acri.org.il/eng/print.aspx?id=340.
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accurately aimed at concrete military targets, and because these
explosive devices, in practice, turn the targeted territory into a
minefield that endangers the civilian population.”90
In July 2007 and in response to a second appeal, Justice Winograd
announced that “the panel’s final report [will] examine the war’s
[compliance with] . . . international law.”91 On January 30, 2008, the
Committee submitted its final report, which indeed included a
chapter on Israel’s compliance with international law, including a
special six-page appendix on the use of CMs.92
Given its status as a governmental investigation commission, it
was obvious that Winograd’s findings would have far reaching
implications. Therefore, heavy censorship was imposed to prevent
release of any reference to CM use found in its report.93 This step
seemed appropriate due to Israel’s diplomatic entanglement with the
United States, which still needed to be resolved. The entanglement’s
origin was in U.S. suspicions that Israel had violated its legislation as
well as a 1976 classified bilateral End-Use Agreement (“1976
Agreement”) (with added assurances and clarifications from April
1978), specifying the conditions for employing U.S.-made CMs.94
90. Id.
91. See Yuval Azoulay, Panel to Probe Alleged IDF War Crimes in Second
Lebanon War, HAARETZ, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/spages/885676.html (noting that Justice Winograd’s announcement was
partially in response to calls from Zehava Gal-On, a left-wing member of Knesset
for the Meretz-Yahad party, and parents of soldiers for investigation of “ethical
misconduct” in regards to Israel's extensive use of CMs during the war).
92. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, 481-94 (Ch. 14, Israel's
compliance with International Law), 495-500 (the CMs appendix).
93. Cf. Dan Izenberg, Winograd Report in English Due Monday, JERUSALEM
POST, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=59202 (stating
that the Committee would release only a censored summary report to the public,
though it presented the full uncensored report to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert and the Minister of Defense). The Committee had been strongly criticized
for failing to release complete and uncensored testimonies from its hearings. Id.
94. See David S. Cloud, Inquiry Opened into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at A1 (announcing that the U.S. State Department's Office
of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (“DTCC”) launched an inquiry into Israel's
use of U.S.-made CMs in late August 2006). See generally, Eitan Barak, Doomed
to be Violated? The U.S.–Israeli Clandestine End-User Agreement and The
Lessons of the Second Lebanon War: Lessons for the Convention on Cluster
Munitions, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2010) (detailing the Israeli-U.S.
diplomatic entanglement, its impact on the CCM, the legal implications of Israel's
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The absence of any mention of CMs from the declassified 150page Interim Report of April 2007 might be justified given its focus
on the decision-making preceding the war’s outbreak.95 The same
cannot be said, however, of similar absences from the censored
testimony of Israel’s Attorney General (“AG”) Meni Mazuz and of
the MAG before the Committee despite the fact—indicated in the
Final Report—that the two were repeatedly questioned on this
issue.96 Furthermore, whereas other chapters may contain an opening
footnote stating that “[t]his chapter was reviewed by the censor,” the
opening footnote of the special six-page appendix of this massive
report, devoted to the issue of CMs, reads: “[p]arts of the
unclassified report were deleted from the document.”97 Needless to
say, neither the diplomatic entanglement nor the 1976 Agreement
with the United States, are acknowledged.98
More importantly, the Commission’s decision to refrain from
examining individual claims of IHL violations, despite press reports
that at least one member (Professor Ruth Gavison) privately defined
CM use as a “war crime,” suggests that its members well-understood
the issue’s sensitivity.99 As expected, its decision to make do with
alleged violations of U.S. legislation, and the classified 1976 bilateral End-Use
Agreement).
95. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 24.
96. For Mendelblit's testimony transcript, published on Dec. 18, 2007, see
Brigadier-General Avihai Mendelblit, Testimony before Winograd Commission,
http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/statements.html#null (last visited May 14, 2010). For
a discussion of Mazuz's testimony, see Mazuz to Winograd: IDF Acted in
Accordance with International Law, YNETNEWS.COM, Dec. 18, 2007,
http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3484207,00.html.
97. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, CMs appendix, 495, n. 1. For a
different version of the text see, e.g., 481, n.1 (Ch. 14, Israel's compliance with IL).
98. A single implicit reference is to be found: "As aforesaid, limitations on the
use of weaponry [i.e. CMs] can be derived from other sources, aside from
international law, such as the army’s orders or agreements with other countries."
See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498, ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
99. According to the report, Professor Gavison was personally informed of the
large-scale use of CMs by a MLRS veteran and reacted strongly against those
involved. This followed the soldier's testimony that when employing CMs
extensively, his battalion's commanders assumed that the MLRS's HDR is 20%.
The soldier, however, later sent a formal detailed letter to the Commission but was
not invited to testify. The Commission spokesman responded that Prof. Gavison "is
not in the habit of commenting on her personal conversations." See Meron
Rapoport, Roger, Over and Out, HAARETZ, Oct. 19, 2007, at 10 (translated from
Hebrew by Caan Rut Avor).
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general conclusions—because, in part, “[w]e did not find it
appropriate to use the large scale of materials brought to us for this
purpose in order to deal with issues that relate to a political and
propaganda war against the state”100—attracted much criticism in
Israel and abroad.101 The ACRI, for instance, defined the latter
argument as “troubling and repugnant” and called for a non-military
independent criminal investigation into the responsibility of those
involved in firing CMs at populated areas.102
Nonetheless, from a review of the uncensored portions, aided by
the MAG’s legal opinion and recently available Israeli sources, seven
lessons can be drawn. Taken together, they point to the salience and
need for a new convention, as well as the weaknesses of the CMs
Draft Protocol—should it be put into effect in the future.

LESSON 1: ON THE FEASIBILITY OF NEGLIGIBLE HDR
Undeniably, concern over CM post-conflict duds nurtured
international support for the CCM. It seems, therefore, that the
United States, a prominent but certainly the most vocal opponent of
the CCM, tried to address this concern in its dual attempt to avoid a
total ban on CMs.103 First, in a propagandist manner, it argued that
100. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 485.
101. See, e.g., Gideon Levi, The Lighthouses Have Been Shut Down, HAARETZ,
Feb. 3, 2008, at B1 (illustrating domestic criticism); see also Amnesty Int’l, Israel:
Winograd Commission Disregards Israeli War Crimes, Jan. 31, 2008,
PRE01/032/2008 (presenting Amnesty International’s own research on the number
of Lebanese civilians killed during Israeli offensives in order to counter the
Commission’s dismissal of the need to investigate serious violations of
international humanitarian law); Richard Boudreaux, Israel Criticized for Cluster
Bombs, Panel Questions Adequacy of Controls on Devices’ Use in 2006 Lebanon
War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A8 (outlining national and international criticism
for the Commission’s failure to look into allegations that Israel violated
international humanitarian law during the war).
102. ACRI, Response Following Publication of the Final Report, Feb. 3, 2008,
http://www.acri.org.il/Story.aspx?id=1678. The response stressed that "the
investigation's essence as a viable tool in democratic operation is based on the
ability to review a matter in depth and thoroughly and not according to it may be
perceived in Israel or abroad". Id.
103. See, e.g., Kim Murphy, Britain Deals a Setback to U.S.; Brown Overrules
His Military and Joins in Cluster Bomb Ban, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A1
(quoting U.S. officials’ position to not join any international effort banning CMs
but instead to convene a meeting solely of the world’s CM producers and users to
discuss controlling their use and proper technological functioning of the weapons).
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CMs in fact “constitute a small portion of the total humanitarian
threat presented by . . . [conventional unexploded munitions],” and,
as the argument goes, no “redundant treaty mechanisms” are needed
beyond the existing ones, located in the CCW 1996 Amended
Protocol II on Mines and Booby-Traps and Protocol V on ERW.104
The Second Lebanon War suggests a flaw in the U.S. argument.
Given the large-scale fire power employed, the use of CMs was quite
limited, less than 10% of total projectiles.105 While any highexplosive shell is a potential dud, one M-26 MLRS Rocket with its
644 M77 bomblets and, according to field tests, a minimum 5%
HDR, means at least 32 potential duds.106 The some 1800 rockets
fired were indeed a scant portion of the 173,293 Israeli artillery
projectiles and rockets fired;107 yet, they were, in effect, capable of
releasing more than a million bomblets.108
After the failure of the first method, the second U.S. attempt
concentrated on a technical solution, i.e., provision of a “new
generation” of CMs that left almost no duds.109 Indeed, the
November 2009 Draft Protocol , which accurately reflected the U.S.
104. DOUG TUTTLE, CENTER FOR DISEASE INFORMATION, U.S. CLUSTER
MUNITIONS POLICY (2008), http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm
?documentID=4216; U.S. White Paper, supra note 73 (“States need to remain
focused on comprehensive post-conflict clearance of all explosive hazards, using
the lessons that have already been learned from decades of successful humanitarian
clearance of landmines.").
105. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 46
(citing a study conducted by three Norwegian organizations and a separate study
by the MACC-SL on the failure rate of cluster munitions launched by Israel during
the war).
106. See id. at 30 (referencing reports of the U.S. Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to Congress on the failure
rate of cluster munitions).
107. Id. at 37 (outlining the factors used by the MACC-SL to estimate the total
number of CMs Israel dropped in Lebanon).
108. Id. at 37-38 (providing U.N. estimates of the number of dangerous
unexploded submunitions based on U.N. calculations of the failure rates of the
artillery cluster shells, MLRS rockets, and CBU-58B cluster bombs fired by
Israel).
109. See Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Pol.-Mil. Aff., On-theRecord Briefing: U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy (May 21, 2008), available at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/updates/0521ClusterStephMull.html (stating that
the United States would advocate for solutions that ensured that the cluster
munitions used would detonate immediately upon contact with designated military
targets rather than later when civilians may be in the area).
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position in this case, proposed two alternative technological
requirements: (a) that each bomblet possess at least one safeguard
(e.g., a self-destruct mechanism) to effectively ensure it “will no
longer function as [an] explosive submunition[]”; and (b)
incorporation of “a mechanism or design which, after dispersal,
results in no more than 1% unexploded ordnance across the range of
intended operational environments” (e.g., desert or woody terrain).110
However, this technology already exists, with an advanced type —
the M85 bomblet—already tested in a real combat situation (the 2006
Lebanon War).111 As expected, its performance in the 2006 War
attracted considerable attention among CCM supporters and
opponents alike. A sixty-four-page, detailed study, conducted by the
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (“FFI”) and British
explosive ordinance experts, found that its HDR actually topped
10%.112 As of June 2007, the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre
South Lebanon (“MACC-SL”) has estimated that the M85 HDR,
given the number of duds found on the ground after the 2006 War, as
“between 5% and 10%.”113 In contrast, relying on the 2003 use of
110. GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 4, ¶ 2;
see also Stephen Mathias, Head of the U.S. Delegation, Points on Humanitarian
Benefit
of
Draft
Protocol
(Nov.
6,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ccwtreaty.com/statements/1106HumanitarianBenefit.html
(emphasizing the United States’ strong support for the two alternatives presented
by the Chairman of the GGE in its fifth session in November 2008).
111. See Military Industry, YEDIOTH AHARANOT (Special Issue), Apr. 26, 2004,
at 8 (noting that already by 2004, Israel Military Industries Ltd. (“IMI”), a
government-owned weapons manufacturer, successfully produced more than 60
million innovative and highly reliable CMs (M85 dual purpose bomblets with a
declared Hazardous Dud Rate (“HDR”) as low as 0.06%)). The HDR's dramatic
reduction is achieved by the inclusion of a Self-Destruct Fuse (“SDF”) which is
operated once bomblets fail to detonate upon impact.
112. See COLIN KING ET AL., M85: AN ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY 15 (Richard
Moyes ed., 2007) (acknowledging that detonation tests by M85 manufacturers and
military personnel who use them grossly underestimate the actual failure rates of
the M85 bomblets in real combat).
113. Chris Clarke, Unexploded Bombs and Submunitions in South Lebanon:
Reliability from a Field Perspective, in HUMANITARIAN, MILITARY, TECHNICAL
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 41, 42 (2007) (countering the
one percent failure rate that military users assert). But see id. at 43 (noting the
criticism to the five to ten percent failure rate data presented by Mr. Clarke; the
criticism consists in that MACC-SL could not have correctly estimated the rate
simply based on counting the munitions that MACC-SL found on the ground after
the war).
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M85 in Iraq by U.K. forces (some 2,000 bombs), Adam Ingram, the
U.K.’s Minister of State for Armed Forces, stated in June 2003 that it
has a proven maximum failure rate of 2%—an estimate he changed
to 5% in November 2006.114 Given such varied estimates, an
examination of the Winograd Commission Final Report should prove
interesting.
Based on the vast material at its disposal, the Commission refused
to accept, as is, the declared HDR of the various types of CMs used.
Given that, its most important finding concerns the Israeli-made M85
bomblets: Instead of the declared HDR of 0.06%, the Commission
estimated the M85 HDR as ranging from 0.5% to 3%!115 In sum,
albeit a declared negligible failure rate, it seems that M85 bomblets
performed poorly in Southern Lebanon’s terrain given their high
reputation as the best of their kind.
As the declared HDR was drawn from extensive experimental
results, it suggests a significant gap between “laboratory conditions”
and real-time combat conditions—as already argued by various
NGOs.116 More importantly, under the proposed Draft Protocol,
employment of a CM weapon is permissible if no significant postconflict civilian harm is anticipated due to the use of new CMs with
a negligible HDR (less than 1 percent).117 However, in the wake of
114. See LANDMINE ACTION, BAN THE "M85" CLUSTER BOMB: FACT-SHEET,
available
at
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/ActionPacks/m85_factsheet.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2009) (dismissing U.K. failure rate estimates based on inconsistent
statements made by the U.K. between June 2003 and May 2007 on the BL755 and
M26 cluster munitions, as well as the lack of tests conducted by the United
Kingdom on the CMs during field operations).
115. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 495, n. 4.
116. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 4546, 48 (comparing the 1.3-2.3% failure rate under testing conditions for the selfdestructing M85 munitions with the 10% actual failure rate reported by three
Norwegian organizations for the M85, and noting the higher failure rates of CMs
fired at short-range and in areas where there is dense vegetation or soft ground to
“catch” CMs, which would not have been tested); see also Colin King, Testing
Times: Unrealistic Reliability Trials Disguise Cluster Munitions Failure Rates, 41
JANE’S INT’L DEF. REV. 30, 30-31 (May 2008) (explaining that human error from
stress and exhaustion during combat, launching munitions one-by-one in tests
versus launching them simultaneously at other times, and cushioning landscapes
account for the difference in failure rates during tests than in real situations).
117. See GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art.
4.2(b) (stating that a State Party to the Protocol is prohibited from using,
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the 2006 War, this state of affairs appears unfeasible, all the while
remembering that this option is considered more effective in
ensuring less civilian harm than the first option proposed by the
Draft Protocol according to which CM weapons use is permissible
once the CM possess at least one effective safeguard, such as a selfdestruct or self-neutralization mechanism.118
According to the Draft Protocol, this condition would come into
effect only after a long transition period (eight to fifteen years, with
an extension option of up to five years in the 2008 draft, to be
reduced to eight years with an extension option of up to four years in
the 2009 draft) following the Protocol’s EIF.119 The Winograd
Commission’s estimate that the true HDR of the popular U.S.-made
CM shells (M42 and M46 bomblets that enjoy an official HDR of
five percent) ranges between twelve percent and eighteen percent120
suggests that the transition period under the Draft Protocol is highly
risky with respect to avoiding a humanitarian crisis due to an
extensive use of CMs. Needless to say, no such a transition period
exists under the CCM.121

LESSON 2: THE WORRISOME IMPLICATIONS OF
“NEGLIGIBLE HDR”
Some NGOs and CM ban supporters have already expressed the
concern that employing CMs with a presumably meaningless HDR
may lead to increased use of CMs due to the assumed decrease in
developing, producing, or otherwise acquiring CMs, unless the CM can be
"delivered accurately to a pre-defined target area” and is designed to “result in no
more than 1% unexploded ordnance” in the area in which the CM is operational).
118. See id. art. 4.2(a) (advancing that two other safeguards include ensuring
that submunitions have a self-deactivating feature or two or more "initiating
mechanisms").
119. Id. art. 4.3. But see Steve Goose, Co-Chair of the Cluster Munitions Coal.,
Hum. Rts. Watch, CMC Statement on Article 4, General Prohibitions and
Restrictions at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (“CCW”) Group of
Governmental Experts (“GGE”) on Cluster Munitions (Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
Goose, CMC Statement] (criticizing the potential thirteen- to twenty-year deferral
period as a effectively allowing states to continue to use CMs during the transition
period). In my view, the 2009 reduction of the potential deferral period to twelve
years makes little difference in this respect.
120. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 495, n.4.
121. See id. The Commission, however, accepted the M-77 bomblets' 5 percent
declared HDR (“MLRS”). Id.
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post-conflict duds122 and, it follows, the intended user’s decreased
apprehensions. As such, the probable 2.4 percent gap between the
would-be user’s estimate and the actual results is quite significant.
Considering the Winograd report and the MAG’s legal opinion,
we must conclude that this unease is realistic. The IDF’s inquiry
revealed, in retrospect, that in only one case were CMs fired into
populated Lebanese territory without any military justification
whatsoever, with the incident indeed defined as a deviation by all
involved.123 When reviewing this case, the MAG noted that the
commanders who ordered the firing made sure that Israeli-made
CMs were used to minimize HDR.124 This admission is most
alarming as it suggests that once armies are equipped with
presumably dud-free CMs, restraints over CM use motivated by postconflict dud effects are considerably weakened. Apparently, given
the declared HDRs of these dud-free CMs, this fear should diminish.
However, as suggested earlier, the declared HDRs are far from
reliable measures;125 as such, increased deployment of CMs may
sustain the current level of their large-scale post-conflict harm.

LESSON 3: ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-VIOLENT
PRECAUTIONS
Whereas the post-conflict dud effects are widely discussed in the
Winograd Report, there is no equivalent discussion regarding the
widespread collateral damage from Israel’s extensive use of CMs
observed during the fighting. The reason for this is quite simple.
Contrary to what one might expect given the magnitude of CM use,
the Committee clearly stated: “We should note that we did not hear
any claims regarding civilian injuries from cluster bombs during the
war.”126 Indeed, even HRW in its February 2008 comprehensive
report counted very few “time of attack casualties” and therefore
122. Goose, CMC Statement, supra note 119 (emphasizing the flawed nature of
provision 4.2(b) because of the inconsistency in the testing methods used by states
to determine failure rates as well as the inaccuracy of testing methods in
determining actual failure rates).
123. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 20.
124. See id.
125. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing some of the factors
that make failure rates unreliable).
126. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 497 (emphasis in original).
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focused on “civilian harm” in the chapter on post-conflict effects.127
Such a surprising gap between large-scale CM use and the marginal
collateral damage during its firing requires an explanation, especially
because this gap limited, a priori, the Committee’s discussion of
CMs to their post-conflict effects.
An explanation for this phenomenon, though absent from the
Winograd Report itself, is detailed in the MAG’s legal opinion and
briefly mentioned in Israel’s formal response to the HRW’s report:
Israel issued advance warnings to the local Lebanese residents.128
Those warnings—required by Article 57(2)(c) of the 1977 Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prescribing that “effective advance
warning . . . be given of attacks . . . affect[ing] the civilian
population”129—were made using various means such as dropping
127. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 52
(recounting stories of civilians who suffered injuries or were killed as a result of
submunitions exploding while they were clearing away debris around their homes
after the war ended); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 80-178, Appendix I (2007)
[hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY DIED] (listing civilian casualties
during the war from CMs and other weapons, and detailing the circumstances
leading to the civilian deaths).
128. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 12324 (explaining that Israel issued advance warnings to civilians in the form of radio
transmissions, leaflet distributions, and via local leaders to evacuate Hezbollahcontrolled areas and weapons stores); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY
DIED, supra note 127, at 67-68 (reprinting IDF flyers distributed to Lebanese
officials and residents south of the Litani River, warning of impending IDF attacks
in their areas and instructing them to vacate the area for their own safety).
129. Protocol I: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, in PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 art. 57 (2) (c) (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross
1996); see also Prosecutor v. Kupre[ki], Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524
(Jan. 14, 2000) (reinforcing that Articles 57 and 58 of the First Additional Protocol
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions constitute customary international law, which
binds Israel to compliance with these provisions even though Israel is not party to
the First Additional Protocol); Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of
the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT,
CHALLENGES AHEAD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 100, 111 (Astrid
J. M. Delissen & Gerard J Tanja, eds., 1991) (asserting that Article 57 of the First
Additional Protocol manifests customary international law; whereas, Article 58
could easily gain recognition as customary international law because it contains
practices that states would widely follow or feel a sense of legal obligation to
follow). But see CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
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leaflet warnings, radio broadcasts,130 direct telephone messages to
thousands of Lebanese families and, in some cases, direct telephone
contact with local Lebanese leaders. Furthermore, “[t]hose warnings
were extensively and persistently echoed in the leading Lebanese and
Arab media” and, as the MAG concluded, they managed to
“convince the residents to leave the area.”131
Nonetheless, such a mass evacuation should be ascribed to a much
more “convincing” means, left unmentioned in both official sources
(the Winograd Report and the MAG legal opinion): an organized
IDF plan for evacuating 170 villages, employing massive artillery
barrages. As recently exposed in one of the IDF’s official journals,
“[t]he firing was firstly directed to the villages’ periphery and after a
short pause, to their center.”132 The fact is, CMs are neither
designated to nor capable of harming civilians hiding in bomb
shelters.133
Much can be said on the legality of this act, irrespective of its
minimal collateral damage in terms of human life. However, for this
article’s purposes, other than providing an explanation for the
mentioned gap and minimal collateral damage from CM use, this
statement is cited to disperse the impression that non-violent
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶
2223 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (noting that in cases where "the element of
surprise in the attack is a condition of its success," the provision allows for
derogation by including the phrase "unless circumstances do not permit"). See
generally Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, 2 SUPP.
AM. J. INT’L L. 90 (1908); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 125-28 (2004) (explaining
the requirement that states must take specific actions to avoid civilian casualties
while planning a military attack, and its origin in the Hague Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annexed to Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907).
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Israeli efforts to
warn the civilian population).
131. See MAG's legal opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 11.
132. See Brigadier-General (Reserve) Ya'acov Zigdon, Much Fire, Little
Thinking, 420-21 MA'ARACHOT [IDF's official journal], Sept. 2008, at 44.
133. See General Sir Hugh Beach, Cluster Bombs: The Case for New Controls,
INT’L SECURITY INFO. SERV. EUROPE 13 (Annex C: Alternatives to Cluster Bombs:
The British Case) (citing a report claiming that cluster bombs are most effective on
penetrating “soft-skinned military vehicles,” rather than thick cement bomb
shelters, and distinguishing cluster bombs from anti-tank cluster weapons designed
to penetrate heavily-armored tanks).
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warnings are sufficient to initiate the mass evacuations necessary to
minimize collateral damage in areas designated for CM attacks.

LESSON 4: IHL FLEXIBILITY AND ITS INCAPACITY TO
PREVENT FURTHER POST-CONFLICT DISASTERS
On November 19, 2006, the then IDF Chief of Staff LieutenantGeneral Dan Halutz, in an unprecedented move, stated that the use of
CMs often constituted a clear violation of his explicit order not to
fire into populated zones.134
His announcement was apparently due to the results of an initial
IDF “operational inquiry into the use of cluster munitions throughout
the Israeli-Lebanese conflict,”135 conducted by Brigadier General
Michael Ben-Baruch, the IDF’s Ground Forces Command, according
to Halutz’s request. Ben-Baruch’s probe had found that while the
Israeli Air Force (“IAF”) had complied with Halutz’s order, the same
order was ignored by the Artillery Corps, which fired thousands of
cluster bombs “mainly in the War’s last days.”136 More importantly,
as part of his announcement, Halutz assigned the Commander of the
IDF’s Military College, Major General Gershon Ha’cohen, “to look
into the implementation of all orders and instructions regarding the
use of cluster type munitions, in the course of the conflict.”137
Ha’cohen’s findings, as detailed in the Winograd Final Report and
the MAG’s legal opinion, in effect provide a favorable picture.
134. See Nir Hason & Meron Rapoport, Chief of Staff Is to Appoint a Major
General to Inquire into Use of Cluster Rockets, HAARETZ, Nov. 20, 2006, at A1
(reporting Halutz's announcement, which was made on November 19, 2006 via the
major Israeli TV channels' evening news programs); Yossi Joshua, IDF Fired
Cluster Bombs Contrary to the Chief of Staff's Order, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Nov.
20, 2006, at 2 (reporting Halutz’s announcement).
135. Israel Probes Use of Cluster Bombs during War with Hizbollah,
WORLDTRIBUNE.COM,
Nov.
22,
2006,
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2006/me_israel_11_21.html
(quoting a military statement).
136. Hason & Rapoport, supra note 134, at 2.
137. IDF Spokesperson Announcement, Maj. Gen. Ha’cohen Appointed to
Inquire the Circumstances of the Use of Cluster Munitions During the IsraeliLebanese
Conflict,
Nov.
20,
2006,
available
at
http://thehague.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Data/104928.pdf; accord Greg Myre, Israel
Orders Investigation of Bomb Use in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A8
(reporting in the United States on Lieutenant General Halutz’s call for an
investigation of IDF’s use of CMs during the 2006 Lebanon war).
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According to both sources, CM use was subjected to three strict
limitations: a) proper safety ranges; b) mapped firing zone; and c) the
Chief of Staff’s approval for each firing.138
The story seems simple: an order by the IDF Chief of Staff
forbidding CM firings in populated areas did exist.139 While IAF use
of air-dropped CMs met all three demands, all those involved in
cases of artillery-delivered CMs (excluding one which was found
deviant by the Northern Command) “acted in this matter according to
the instructions and orders given . . . by their supervising
headquarters.”140 The one exception was the Wartime Officer in
Command (“O.C.”), the Northern Command, Major General
(Reserve) Udi Adam, with respect to whom, the MAG noted, “some
flaws were found in his actions.”141 Given the circumstances,
however, the MAG decided that “there is no room at present for
disciplinary or other measures against the [Northern] Command’s
O.C.”142 While Adam’s “few flaws” were not detailed, the absence of
any legal action taken against him was explained by the MAG as
follows: (a) Adam had already resigned his post and left the army;
(b) much more importantly, his flaws were on the “professional level
(unlike the moral or legal level, in the sense that no deviation from
Israel’s duties according to international law was found).”143
With reference to the CM Draft Protocol, a long transition period
had been proposed between the Protocol’s entry into force—during
which use of “older-generation” CMs is allowed under specified
conditions, the first condition being approval by “the highestranking operational commander in the area of operations or by the
appropriate politically mandated operational authority, in accordance
with its national procedure.”144
138. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 497.
139. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY DIED, supra note 127, at 238-39
(commenting that IDF soldiers knew that they should not target cluster munitions
at civilians because Order No. 33.0133 issued by the IDF Chief of Staff mandated
them to conform their actions to the Geneva Conventions).
140. MAG's Legal Opinion , supra note 25, ¶ 48.
141. Id. ¶ 46.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶ 47.
144. GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, arts.
4.4(a)-5 (emphasis added) (obligating States Parties to the Protocol to implement
the restricted use of CMs with permission from one of these two sources, and to
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The Northern Command’s O.C., Adam, met the “highest-ranking
operational comander” criterion.145 However, the IDF findings
implicate Adam as the officer responsible for the violations; the
lower echelons only obeyed his orders.146 Adam may indeed be to
blame. Alternatively, Israel might be sacrificing him in order to
evade the threatened U.S. sanctions following the State Department’s
inquiry into possible violations of its legislation regarding use of
American-made CMs.147 In either case, this incident suggests that the
CM Draft Protocol’s important condition for avoiding a humanitarian
crisis during the lengthy transition period is far from foolproof.
Indeed, although it is less likely that a senior officer (as opposed to a
junior officer) will err in this regard, the 2006 War demonstrated
how weak this assumption may be in the field.
Second, much more alarming and, as such, a strong argument in
favor of the CCM, is MAG’s argument that despite the magnitude of
CM use against the relatively populated area of South Lebanon, the
deployment was still in full compliance with IHL. In a nutshell,
Israel’s extensive use of CMs—which, as the MAG stressed, is “a
legal weapon which does not inflict superfluous injury on the enemy

also take steps not to develop new CMs that would be prohibited under the
protocol, to technologically improve the accuracy and failure rate of the new CMs
produced, and to pare down stores of CMs to only the amount necessary for
military operations).
145. See Yaakov Katz, Security and Defense: Udi Adam’s War, JERUSALEM
POST, July 20, 2006, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=11
53291961904&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull (reporting that the IDF
employed a new command structure during the second Lebanon war in which
Major-General Udi Adam, the Northern Command’s O.C., was in charge of all
IDF ground, navy, and air forces in the Lebanon operation zone, rather than just
ground forces).
146. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 9798 (observing that soldiers attributed command responsibility for the firing of CMs
to the land forces command, headed by Major-General Adam, who, as they
alleged, ordered all use of CMs).
147. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the investigation of
Israeli misuse of U.S.-made bombs); see also JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. REP. FOR CONGRESS, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO ISRAEL 7-8 (2008),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf (reporting on the
potential end of aid to Israel under the Arms Export Control Act, following the
U.S. Department of State’s preliminary conclusion that Israel may have violated a
classified bilateral procurement agreement restricting the use of cluster bombs in
civilian-populated areas).
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(i.e., within the principle of humanity)”148—was legal as there was
(1) a concrete military necessity to prevent rockets being fired at
Israel; and (2) the principles of distinction and proportionality were
maintained because the CMs were fired exclusively at military
targets and only after it was determined that the potential collateral
damage was not disproportionate to the military advantage gained.149
In practice, the MAG held the view that excluding the clear deviation
already mentioned and an additional case in which CMs were used to
assist in evacuating forces,150 CMs were used in populated areas
solely as an immediate defensive response to rocket attacks after
non-combatants were evacuated from these same targets.151 That is,
all the uses, save one, were lawful.
A critical review of the MAG’s analysis deserves a separate article
and, more importantly, has little to do with this article’s purpose.
Analyses of CM legality per se152 and of the legality of CM use in
148. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 38 ; see also Herthel, supra note
30, at 257-59 (presenting the debate among legal scholars as to whether the
criticisms that CMs cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering should
warrant banning them as inhumane when they also serve significantly useful
military functions); Karen Hulme, Of Questionable Legality: The Military Use of
Cluster Bombs in Iraq in 2003, in THE CANADIAN BRANCH, INT’L LAW ASS’N &
THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT’L LAW, THE CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 165-69 (2004) (postulating on the characterization of
CMs as causing “unnecessary suffering” based on the amount of bodily damage
that they can cause when smaller fragments come in contact with the human body);
Thomas M. McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of International
Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 66-74 (2002) (assessing whether the use of CMs
satisfies the balancing test that governs the prohibition of weapons causing
superfluous injury in light of criteria proposed by the International Committee of
the Red Cross on the foreseeability of the injuries that may be caused by the CM’s
design). See generally Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering, 299 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98, 98-122 (1994) (detailing
the history of the principle of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and its
application through the Hague Regulations and First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions of 1977).
149. See MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶¶ 32-39. For a summary of this
argument see WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498, ¶ 10.
150. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25. In this case, the firing was at the
Lebanese village of Maroon-A-Ras on July 20, and Halutz himself justified the use
post facto. Id.
151. See MAG’s Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶¶ 18-20.
152. See, e.g., Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as
Indiscriminate Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 85, 104-19 (2000-2001) (assessing whether cluster bomb use constitutes
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specific cases (e.g., Kosovo, Iraq)153 are readily available; they can
be applied, mutatis mutandis, in this case as well. Furthermore, the
current case has already attracted several attempts of legal analyses
by NGOs.154 and would likely have been discussed by Israel’s High
Court of Justice had not ACRI backed down from its intention to
submit a petition regarding the absence of any legal action taken
against those responsible for the extensive CM use.155
indiscriminate use because of the natural geographic imprecision associated with
their use and the ability for unexploded cluster bombs to become landmines when
they fail to detonate on impact); Herthel, supra note 30, at 249, 265-68 (concluding
that cluster bombs are not naturally indiscriminate because customary international
law has not deemed them to be, and that the large area which cluster bombs can
affect does not automatically deem them to be indiscriminate); Breitegger, supra
note 28, at 9-13 (considering that military necessity weighed against humanitarian
concerns might require the use of cluster munitions, providing a reason why cluster
munitions could not be per se illegal); Van Woudenburg, supra note 3, at 454-64
(noting the statements of commentators that no treaty or rule of customary
international law specifically makes cluster munitions illegal, nor do they
indirectly make them illegal by prohibiting their use, so long as they cause no
civilian casualties).
153. See generally McDonnell, supra note 148 (using the NATO intervention in
Kosovo as an example of the use of cluster bombs in order to assess whether
international law prohibits their use altogether); cf. Hulme, supra note 148
(analyzing whether U.S. use of cluster munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom
was inherently indiscriminate given the high failure rate of the CMs and other
known factors such as the effect of geographical and weather conditions on the
scattering of submunitions over large areas).
154. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63,
at 104-11 (concluding that Israel could foresee that its use of cluster munitions
would violate international humanitarian law because of the disproportionality of
attacks against civilian areas in the last days of the war as well as the less-thanthorough means of communicating with Lebanese civilians to evacuate areas that
the IDF planned to bomb).
155. Telephone interview with Adv. Dan Yakir, Chief Legal Counsel at ACRI,
Oct. 29, 2008. Email correspondence, Dec. 22, 2008; May 29, 2010; May 30,
2010. In fact, as long as there was an IDF "on-going investigation," over CM use,
no domestic legal action was available to those Israeli NGOs and civil right
advocates, which believed that their use constitutes an IHL violation; once the
investigation ended and the ACRI's January 2008 request to the MAG to release
his legal opinion still went unanswered, the ACRI turned to AG Mazuz in March
2008, urging him to open a criminal inquiry into Israel's extensive use of the
weapon. See Re: Opening a Criminal Inquiry over the Use of Cluster Bombs in the
Second Lebanon War, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.acri.org.il/Story.aspx?id=1785.
Three months later, on June 18, 2008, the MAG released a short version of his
legal opinion. After reviewing the opinion, the ACRI decided not to withdraw its
appeal to Mazuz, who has refrained from even acknowledging the ACRI's letter.
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Nevertheless, what is important for our purposes is the
unavoidable conclusion that states can fire millions of bomblets at
populated areas and remain confident that their actions fully comply
with IHL. Thus IHL, in itself, can do little to prevent future massive
CM use, not because states adamantly choose to commit gross
violations of IHL, but because they are confident that IHL is on their
side. As such, it seems that only a total ban can secure the world
against similar cases in the future.156

LESSON 5: NONE TO BE TRUSTED: ISRAEL’S
UNCONTROLLED CM USE
No doubt, unlike technical issues (e.g., HDRs of various CM
types), the Winograd Commission was more mindful of Israel’s
formal stance when examining the core issue: Israel’s extensive CM
use. On this issue, the Committee preferred to rely on Ha’cohen’s
findings as to the impossibility of verifying the duds’ numbers and
locations, dates of CMs employment, designated targets, and
circumstances of firing.157
This article respectfully but categorically disagrees with the
Winograd Commission’s findings regarding this issue: the duds’
numbers and locations are readily available through MACC SL’s
monthly reports.158 In addition, the last three factors are quite

156. Indeed, alternative weapons designed to cover widespread areas (area
weapons), such as flechettes or Fuel-Air Explosive (“FAE”) bombs, may be
equally devastating at the time of use but pose no serious post-conflict damage
because no dud problems arise. See Fuel/Air Explosive (FAE),
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/fae.htm (last visited May 14, 2010)
(explaining the operation of the FAE and capacity to cause damage through release
of a vapor cloud rather than expelling an explosive). For a comprehensive
overview of the humanitarian concerns regarding flechettes, see EITAN BARAK,
DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGALITY OF FLECHETTE WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW – A REAPPRAISAL FOLLOWING ISRAEL’S USE IN THE GAZA STRIP (2001-2009)
(Christopher Greenwood & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, forthcoming 2010) (on file with the author).
157. See generally WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24.
158. See, e.g. Mine Action Coordination Ctr. S. Lebanon, Quarterly Report of
the Mine Action Coordination Centre, South Lebanon for the Period April to June
2007 (2007), available at http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MACC%20
Quarterly%20April%20-%20June%202007.pdf (charting the number of civilian
mine incidents during the quarter, as well as the number of mines cleared in the
time period).
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accessible for most used CMs, and can be tracked by (digital)
operational logbooks of any artillery unit, not to mention an IAF
squadron logbook.159 Furthermore, all of the respective information
has been collected by the IDF’s Investigating Officer, Ha’cohen,
who testified before the Commission.160 The Commission indeed
explained at length its decision to refrain from inquiring into whether
Israel had complied with the Law of War during the Second Lebanon
War, as well as to disregard specific cases and NGO allegations of
IHL violations, both based on its inability to construct the
appropriate evidentiary infrastructure. The fact that some allegations
of IHL violations have already been reviewed or will be reviewed by
the appropriate bodies, together with the issue of due process of
expected IDF personnel likely to be found liable for those IHL
violations were raised as well.
Nevertheless, regarding Israel’s extensive CM use, the
Commission’s explicit concern over its findings’ abuse by anti-Israel
forces, in addition to its wariness regarding potential diplomatic
entanglements, seems to have played a significant role in its decision
to sidestep a truly independent, in-depth inquiry. Such an inquiry
would, after all, have either verified or refuted Israel’s formal
explanation, according to which firing CMs at populated areas
entailed a clear breach of IDF orders; that explanation assisted the
pro-Israeli Bush Administration to end the diplomatic strain resulting
from use of U.S.-made CMs.161 Because the Winograd Commission
refrained from scrutinizing the MAG’s findings,162 it falls upon us to
do so with all the other sources available. These sources imply that
the MAG’s findings regarding the well-organized and supervised
CM use may be incomplete. Moreover, Israel’s extensive use of
munitions in general and CMs in particular is a worrying sign for a
world in which armed conflicts are frequent in environments having
no bans or even use restrictions on CMs, as discussed below.

159. The IDF has no data regarding 25% of the total 173,293 projectiles and
rockets fired. However, due to the IDF's sensitivity over CM weapons, most of its
data refer to other type of munitions, mainly smoke and explosive shells. See
Zigdon, supra note 132, at 51 & n.23.
160. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24.
161. Id. at 484-85.
162. Id.
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In light of the Second Lebanon War’s limited geographical area
and short duration (34 days), there is no doubt that an unprecedented
quantity of munitions, especially CMs, were fired even considering
Israel’s many wars. In the 1967 Six-Day War, 78,812 shells were
fired against three regular armies (the Egyptian, Syrian, and
Jordanian, with the assistance of Iraqi forces); in the 1973 War,
145,000shells were used against two regular armies (Egyptian and
Syrian, with the assistance of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and to a lesser
extent, Saudi forces); in the 1982 first Lebanon War, 81,230 shells
were used; but in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, 173,293 shells and
MLRS rockets were used.163 In contrast, Israel took control over the
same area using only 17,000 shells (i.e., in the March 1978 the Litani
Operation).164 The use of aerial munitions was even more
unprecedented given the large number of sorties the IAF conducted;
an average of 350 sorties per day, more than in the 1973 War.165
Their daily average was reduced only when the IAF reached the red
line of selected munition stocks.166
No doubt, as the Winograd Commission stressed: “the quantity of
munitions used in the Second Lebanon War was very high compared
to former wars.”167 The real problem associated with these figures,
however, is that this massive use of artillery was neither planned nor
properly supervised. As the former Commander of the IDF’s Military
College, Brigadier General (Reserve) Yaacov Zigdon discovered that
“[t]he intensified munitions consumption and the reaching of red
lines point to a lack of control, ignorance and lack of supervision
over the army.”168 Israeli military commentators were much bolder in
their criticism: “While the Israeli society was certain that the IDF

163. Zigdon, supra note 132, at 44-45. For additional data on the 1973 War, see
ALHANAN OREN, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: A HISTORY 322 (2004) (in Hebrew).
164. OFER SHELAH & YOAV LIMOR, CAPTIVES OF LEBANON 159 (2007) (in
Hebrew).
165. AMOS HAREL & AVI ISSACHAROFF, SPIDER WEBS (34 DAYS) 292 (2008) (in
Hebrew).
166. Id. These data are missing from the English translation (see AMOS HAREL
& AVI ISSACHAROFF, 34 DAYS: ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH, AND THE WAR IN LEBANON
(Ora Cummings & Moshe Tlamim trans., 2008). On the massive air power
employed see Genenera (Reserve) Itzhak Ben Israel, The First Missile War: IsraelHizbollah, Position Paper, Tel-Aviv Univ., at 41 (2007) (in Hebrew).
167. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 345, ¶ 37 (emphasis in original).
168. Zigdon, supra note 132, at 52.
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artillery fire was constrained by higher powers, in actuality the army
[IDF], fired everything it had . . . with no control . . . without a
higher command to regulate, monitor, and supervise the ineffective
flood of artillery fire.”169
Earlier press reports and personal accounts of uncontrolled
artillery fire was recently confirmed by the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs
and Security Committee (“FASC”), which reviewed various aspects
of the war with all the material at hand. The FASC concluded in its
December 2007 report—which, as an official report, was subject to a
severe censorship and excludes any mention of CMs—that “basing
the military campaign on the fire component brought about the
extensive use of different types of munitions from the War’s
breakout. Attempts to restrain consumption by the General Staff’s
Munitions Committee were of no avail.”170 In fact, it was found that
only on July 28, a fortnight after the war’s beginning, was the Chief
of Staff presented with the arsenal status for the first time.171 Given
the high munitions consumption rate reached, weekly weapons
quotas for the various IDF units were decided.172 Nonetheless, the
FASC found that neither the Munitions Committee nor the General
Staff were able to enforce this decision on the operational level.173 A
similar conclusion was reached by another official committee: the
Defense Budget Review Committee which, in its May 2007 report,
found that there was “highly excessive” use of munitions and that
“no one in the army or the government had been designated with the
task of reviewing this question and ordering any changes.”174
And so, unlike the favorable image sketched in the MAG’s legal
opinion, Israel’s use of munitions in general and CMs in particular
169. SHELAH & LIMOR, supra note 164, at 159.
170. See KNESSET FOR. AFF. & SECURITY COMM. [KFASC], LESSONS OF THE
SECOND LEBANON WAR 113 (2007), http://portal.knesset.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/
215EB752-A463-4E11-88DA-E1F087A72E44/151/bitachon17_2.pdf (in Hebrew).
171. KFASC, supra note 170, at 113.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE DEFENSE BUDGET REVIEW COMMITTEE 90-91
(2007), available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/F1FF400E-2A04-404290C0-FCEDD874AF88/0/Brodet.pdf (in Hebrew). The Committee is known as the
Brodet Committee after its head, David Brodet, former CEO of Israel's Ministry of
Treasury. P.M. Olmert assigned the committee in November 2006 to examine the
defense budget in the wake of the Lebanon War.
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was unconstrained. As Hagai Alon, a former political adviser of
wartime Minister of Defense Amir Peretz recently confessed:
Only after the war did we, Amir and I, first learn about the
use of cluster bombs . . . the responsible echelons in the IDF
refused to provide me the maps [of the strike locations].175
They wanted to hide the fact that we have fired this
problematic weapon into populated zones like crazy. This
was done without any higher authorization and in an
uncontrolled manner . . . .176
While the question remains open as to how much it was affected
from the fact that, as scholars have already noted, revenge played a
considerable role in Israel’s conduct during the War,177 few states, if
any, can criticize Israel for its actions. Neither American nor British
cities, for instance, were under rocket barrage when their armies
employed CMs abroad (i.e., in Vietnam, Iraq, and Kosovo).178 One

175. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 40 (noting that Israel provided
such maps at the war’s end); see IDF spokesman: No Sweeping Prohibition,
HAARETZ, Sep. 8, 2006, at 4 (in Hebrew); see also Interview with Mrs. Rodica
Radian Gordon, Director, Arms Control Department, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Aff.
(Oct. 7, 2008) (confirming that Israel provided such maps in February 2008 in
addition to at the war’s end). But see The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701
(2006), ¶ 39, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/730 (quoting,
"[w]hile the IDF has provided some maps . . . they are not specific enough to be of
use to operators on the ground. I expect that Israel will provide further detailed
information to UNIFIL regarding the exact location, quantity and type of cluster
munitions utilized during the conflict"); Ina Friedman, Deadly Remnants,
JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 13, 2006, at 20, 22 (reporting that Israel, in contrast, has so
far refused to provide detailed maps with corresponding quantities, arguing that
UNSC Res.1701 "did not require Israel to provide the GPS coordinates, as it
speaks only of conveying to the United Nations all remaining maps of land mines
in Lebanon in Israel's possession,” and explaining IDF Code of Conduct author
and Professor Asa Kasher’s justification that the refusal stood Israel's interest in
preventing exposure of its intelligence regarding the exact location of various
Hezbollah posts).
176. Akiva Eldar, interview with Hagai Alon, Amir Peretz's political adviser,
Captured in Conception, HAARETZ FRIDAY MAGAZINE, 21, 24 (July 18, 2008) (in
Hebrew).
177. See Oded Löwenheim & Gadi Heimann, Revenge in International Politics,
17 SEC. STUD. 685, 723 (2008) (arguing that this is because some states may view
a violation of their rights as more offensive than other states would in a similar
situation).
178. Hum. Rts. Watch, Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice 61 (Feb.
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can only imagine the level of munitions, including CMs, which these
states might use should they find themselves in a similar situation.179
The strategic bombing in WWII is a worrying sign of this tendency.
As long as CMs are integral parts of military arsenals,180 it seems
quite plausible that states possessing CM weapons, when facing a
situation similar to that of Israel in 2006, would massively employ
CMs.

LESSON 6: ON THE CM’S ALLEGED MILITARY
EFFECTIVENESS
As mentioned, CMs enjoy a reputation for high military
effectiveness. As Ambassador Mull has stated: “The United States
relies on them as an important part of our own defense strategy.
Many of our allies rely on them as well.”181 Therefore, it is
interesting to assess whether this image remains warranted after the
2006 Lebanon case as well, particularly given the prominent role that
CMs played when compared to other conflicts in which they were
employed. In fact, while reviewing former cases of CM use, a 2007
study was forced to qualify its conclusion regarding the CM’s
“Declining Military Utility” due to the lack of data from the 2006
Lebanon case.182 As such, this lesson has unique import given the
current debate between CCM supporters who question whether CMs
had not become a “Cold War relic”183 and those who maintain the
stance taken by Ambassador Mull.

2007.
179. This question would effectively be relevant only for the United States; the
United Kingdom has signed the CCM whereas the United States has not. See
Convention on Cluster Munitions, Ratifications and Signatures, supra note 1.
180. See id. at 1-2 (acknowledging that the CM weapons category is the most in
need of stronger laws that protect citizens because of their growing use).
181. Mull, supra note 109 (recognizing the effectiveness of CMs but also their
devastating impact on civil society).
182. Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster
Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 66-69 (2007) (“The Israeli
military has not made a statement on why it used cluster munitions in this
circumstance or whether it judged them to be effective.").
183. Id. at 66-67 (noting that this question was also raised by U.S. forces (Third
Infantry Division) which employed CMs in the 2003 war in Iraq, where the
soldiers complained that the weapons endangered their own forces as well as
civilians).
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As noted previously, artillery CMs were employed to achieve
three objectives, the first two of which provided Israel with its
official justification for their massive use:184 (a) preventing rocket
fire on Israel by targeting the rocket launchers (which consumed ten
percent of total shells and rockets); (b) in the event that the rocket
launchers could not be destroyed, limiting the amount of rockets
fired by disrupting activities in the area (which consumed twenty
percent of total shells and rockets; in addition to artillery CMs,
aerially dropped CMs were used as well); and (c) providing artillery
support for ground forces (which consumed forty percent of total
shells and rockets).185
With respect to the first objective, despite the six thousand cases in
which the IDF pinpointed the launching site and instantly shelled it
during the Second LebanonWar, mainly with CM rockets, there was
not even one single case of a recorded success. In fact, Hezbollah’s
ability to fire an impressive 250 rockets on the very last day of the
War testified to this failure.186
As for the second objective, the rationale was that constant firing
of CMs would prevent Hezbollah’s militiamen from approaching
their launchers. Based on intelligence data and general estimates,
Israeli fire was executed in fifty “nature reserves” and two hundred
villages which turned out to be launching sites—indeed, as the war
lengthened, the amount of munitions needed became unprecedented.
Nonetheless, legitimate187 and tactically reasonable as this objective
was, it achieved little more than a local effect, with only a twenty
percent reduction in launches. As the Knesset’s FASC concluded:

184. See UNHRC REPORT, supra note 77, ¶ 55 (finding that the use of CMs was
inconsistent with principles of distinction and proportionality).
185. See Zigdon, supra note 132, at 48-49 (declaring that no reliable record of
the nature of the remaining 30% of shells used exists).
186. Id. As Harel & Issacharoff wrote: "Even today, artillerymen are not able to
point out a single launcher which was definitely destroyed in artillery fire.” See
Zigdon, supra note 132, at 287.
187. See TIMOTHY H. MCCORMACK & PARAMDEEP B. MTHARU, EXPECTED
CIVILIAN DAMAGE & THE PROPORTIONALITY EQUATION: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW & EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR 9 (2006), available at
http://www.apcml.org/documents/un_report_exp_civilian_damage_1106.pdf
(noting that choosing CMs that leave many duds in order to prevent enemy access
to defined areas was in fact recognized as a mid- to long-term military advantage;
but, of course, this only applied to the nature reserves).
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“[I]n spite of the extensive firing, from an analysis of our forces’
firing data . . . it clear that the disruption mission had only a minor
and short-term affect. In general, it could not, in itself, influence the
extent of rockets fired by Hezbollah.”188
As to the third objective of Israel’s employing artillery CMs (i.e.,
minimizing IDF casualties as much as possible by relying on large
amounts of munitions), the lack of adequate high command
supervision was obvious. For instance, “the town Alkhiam [15,000
inhabitants, mainly Shia Muslims] was heavily bombarded, in the
absence of precise and clear intelligence, for no effective purpose
and or reason.”189 According to the Knesset’s FASC, “there was also
an excess use of munitions [used to support ground forces] given the
needs and the fire’s limited efficiency.”190
In sum, the near-consensus among Israeli writers quite soon after
the war that the use of CMs in 2006 was to no avail has been
confirmed by official Israeli sources. None of the three IDF military
objectives approved for CMs employment justified their use given
the humanitarian costs such weapons can incur. Hence, as this lesson
suggests, CM military effectiveness should be reconsidered when
facing today’s new and changing battlefield. Designated for
traditional battlefields such as those faced in the 1973 War, during
which regular armies and heavy armored forces fought one another,
CMs perform poorly against small guerilla squads, which sometimes
employ nothing but a lone launcher and are capable of evading IDF
spotting systems.
This lesson accords with recent research pointing to the “declining
military utility” of CMs.191 While these studies base their conclusions
188. KFASC, supra note 170, at 113.
189. Zigdon, supra note 132, at 50 (recognizing that the magnitude of munitions
for this purpose reached such a level that it was argued that in some cases relying
on the heavy fire even replaced required maneuvers).
190. KFASC, supra note 170, at 51, 113 (explaining that it was clear in many
cases that there was no proper purpose behind the fire). As Brigadier-General
Lorance Mualem, Chief of Artillery Corps stated, "in the absence of maneuvers,
what is left to do, is fire!" Id.
191. See, e.g., Docherty, supra note 182, at 59-61 (asserting that various
generals and the Congressional Research Service disfavor the use of these weapons
because of decreasing utility); see also REINHILDE WEIDACHER ET AL., CLUSTER
WEAPONS: NECESSITY OR CONVENIENCE? 20-25 (2005) (declaring that cluster
weapons are often being replaced with other more precise weapons with unitary
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on recent conflicts, it is interesting to note that CMs became
entrenched in Western military thinking following the Vietnam
War.192 However, if one were to review the effectiveness of CMs in
that war, one would also reach the conclusion that the United States
apparently achieved no sustainable battlefield advantages from using
more than 350 million bomblets of various types.193 Official U.S.
assessments regarding use of CMs in the 1991 Operation Desert
Storm194 and in the 1999 Kosovo Campaign, for instance—before the
U.S. Command hurriedly replaced an unfavorable report on their use
with a positive one195—indicate that any assessment of the weapon’s
effectiveness may be somehow overestimated should Israel, for
example, becomes involved in a more “traditional” war against
Syria.196
warheads).
192. See, e.g., Docherty, supra note 182, at 64 (noting that the country of Laos
still suffers effects of these weapons).
193. Cf. PROKOSCH, supra note 32, at 112 (examining the difficulties of
assessing the weapons' "actual impact" during that War).
194. See RAE MCGRATH, CLUSTER BOMBS: THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND
IMPACT ON CIVILIANS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 7 (Richard Lloyd ed., 2000)
(recording that U.S. forces used 47,167 units containing 13,167,544 bomblets in
Operation Desert Storm).
195. See id. (explaining the data given in the Defense Department Report). See
generally DEPT. OF DEF., KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-ACTION
REPORT (2000) (assessing the comprehensive investigation that U.S. forces
conducted in Kosovo).
196. E.g., WEIDACHER ET AL., supra note 191, at 25 (basing its findings on a
survey about CMs and military utility among forty-five countries from which
forty-three had stockpiled these weapons, and positing that "Israel is one of very
few Western countries still facing a possibility of massive armored attacks, a
situation where cluster weapons have a major role”); see also Reuven Pedatzur, If
War Breaks Out, HAARETZ, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages
/915893.html (reporting that current military analyses on the Syrian army have
pointed that "the Syrian army has gradually become less armored and less
mechanized; it is more and more based on infantry, commando units and antitank
weapons."). But see Yaakov Katz, Massive IDF Drill Prepares for Syrian Attack.
Hundreds of Tanks Thousands of Troops in Golan War Simulation, JERUSALEM
POST, Apr. 27, 2007, at 1 (asserting that due to an IDF post-Lebanon War large
scale drill, "the IDF has not ruled out the possibility that a war would also entail
tank battles, once believed to have been a relic of historic wars like the Six Day
War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973"); Middle East Military Balance:
Syria, INST. NAT’L SECURITY STUD. DATABASE, May 16, 2007, at 6, available at
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188214444.pdf (implying that MLRS
equipped with CMs rockets may prove to be effective in targeting mass artillery
batteries Syria has deployed along its 1974 disengagement line with Israel border
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LESSON 7: THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE
WINOGRAD COMMISSION TO THE CASE FOR THE CCM
The conclusion from the MAG’s legal opinion, according to which
Israel’s extensive use of CMs fully accorded with IHL, is that
millions of bomblets can be fired at populated areas and their
vicinity, as happened in the 2006 War.197 This seemed preposterous
even for the Winograd Commission, but it refrained from any inquiry
which would undermine the IDF version. Instead, it chose to focus
on the following “legal-factual question”:
What is the legality of Cluster Munitions firing at military target
within civilian concentration, such as village, . . . when it is known
that the village’s residents are temporarily absent due to the warfare,
but it is known that they would return to their villages in its
aftermath?198
According to the MAG’s view,—which the committee mistakenly
named “an extended interpretation” because the legal review was
conducted during the warfare itself199—if the use of CMs at that time
is in accordance with IHL, then the anticipated long-term impact of
the duds should not affect the results. Consequently, even if the
MAG was cognizant of the actual post-conflict effects on South
Lebanon, he argued that such a use could accord with IHL.200
However, the Winograd Commission rejected this view, stating
that such an “extended interpretation . . . is inconsistent with the
underlying rationale of the restrictions on the use of CMs.”201
Therefore, it concluded that allowing CM use in populated areas
due to the massive Syrian defense force).
197. See MAG’s Legal Opinion, supra note 25; see also Israel: Cluster Bomb
Use
Was
Legal,
CNN.COM,
Dec.
25,
2007,
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/25/israel.cluster.bombs/index.html
(reporting that the Israeli military advocate general would not prosecute anyone
who authorized use of the cluster bombs during the 2006 war).
198. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498 (emphasis in original).
199. Id.; cf. Israeli Ministry of For. Aff., The Operation in Gaza: Factual and
Legal Aspects, ¶ 251, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation_Gaza_factual_and_leg
al_aspects_use_of_force_IDF_conduct_5_Aug_2009.htm (reporting that Israeli
targeting decisions during the Gaza Operation were planned in advance with
military and legal officers).
200. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, ¶ 12.
201. Id. at 498.
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“even after their residents have been temporarily evacuated” is
unacceptable “without stringent and individual review.”202 The
Commission then asked the IDF to ensure that its view would be
promptly and clearly internalized by the IDF.203
No doubt, this is an important contribution to a long standing and
disputed issue having far-reaching implications for CMs’ legality.
The main argument used to undermine that legality was that CMs are
inherently indiscriminate weapons. Under the principle of
discrimination, which, together with the “Principle of Humanity,” is
a “cardinal principle” governing the use of conventional weapons,204
states should never “use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets.”205
202. Id. But see Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Israel: Winograd Commission
Disregards Israeli War Crimes (Jan. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/israel-winograd-commissiondisregards-israeli-war-crimes-20080131 (arguing that the Winograd Commission
only gave token consideration to the indiscriminate killings in its report and did not
provide adequate data on the cluster bombs used during the war).
203. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498. (acknowledging, however,
that its own interpretation would impose further restrictions on the IDF against
those who use "built-up areas" as a basis of their operations—a method of warfare
explicitly prohibited by the IHL).
204. See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8) (“States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of
means in the weapons they use.”); see Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631("In
addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
forbidden . . . (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the
hostile nation or army”; The Secretariat, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts: Existing Rules of International Law Concerning the Prohibition or
Restriction of Use of Specific Weapons, at ¶ 7, delivered to the United Nations
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/9215 (Nov. 7, 1973) (explaining that the Martens
Clause in the Hague Convention is an additional ground for prohibition of
treacherous or perfidious weapons, referring to the effects of weapons such as
mines, booby traps, and delayed-action bombs on noncombatants); R.R. Baxter,
Conventional Weapons Under Legal Prohibitions, 1 INT’L SEC. 42, 47 (1977)
(noting that the existing law governing the use of prohibited weapons is “archaic
and excessively general” in character). But see KALSHOVEN, supra note 31, at 237
(explaining that, in regard to the 1974 Lucerne Conference of Governmental
Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (“Lucerne Conference”),
"[t]he prevalent feeling was that the concept did not merit a separate place among
the legal criteria governing use of conventional weapons”).
205. Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 257 (stressing that humanitarian law
was created to eliminate unnecessary harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve
legitimate military objectives); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 57 (in
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Traditionally, it has been argued that CMs are inherently
indiscriminate as their wide dispersal pattern (known in military
parlance as ‘footprint’) means that they cannot be targeted against
military objectives exclusively.206 Employing thus might CMs violate
Article 51(4)(b) of AP I, which reflects customary IHL regarding
weapons that cannot be directed at specific military targets.207
However, when the problem associated with ERW came to the fore,
the emphasis shifted to the CMs’ inherently high failure rate rather
than their inaccuracy.208 Under the new emphasis, it was argued that
since CMs cause casualties after a conflict’s end, then those
casualties are, in effect, only civilian. Indeed, the ICRC Commentary
of AP I seems to suggest that unrecorded minefields having mines
without reliable self-destruct mechanisms violate Article 51(4)(b).209

addition to these two "cardinal principles," it was argued that "the Court identified
a third fundamental principle: the principle of neutrality, whereby, inter alia, the
effects of weapons must be contained within the territories of the belligerent
States.”). But see CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 252 (2007) (pointing out that it is hard to conceive that "[t]his principle has
only very limited significance for the use of weapons other than nuclear weapons .
. ." [and we should add biological ones as well]).
206. See Docherty, supra note 182, at 57-61 (documenting that some weapons
are so difficult to target that they endanger military forces as well as civilian
populations).
207. See, e.g., Hulme, supra note 148, at 173-74 (arguing that inaccurate
weapons that have little or no guidance systems cannot discriminate effectively
between military and civilian objects); see also PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 129,
¶¶ 1956-60; MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 305 (1987) (commenting that the reference in AP
I 51(4)(b) prohibits “ ‘blind’ weapons which cannot, with any reasonable assurance
be directed against a military objective.”)
208. See, e.g., Hulme, supra note 148, 175-89 (pointing out that natural
conditions such as wind and marshes are likely to worsen the failure rate of cluster
bombs); McDonnell, supra note 148, at 79-87 (concluding that, in Serbia and
Kosovo, the risking of civilian lives was “excessive compared to the non-existent
military advantage.”); see also Breitegger, supra note 28, at 10 (positing that this
shift may have been affected by the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”)
acceptance of the nuclear weapons states' reasoning in the Nuclear Weapons Case,
according to which a weapon is inherently indiscriminate only if its use would
result in military and civilian casualties in all circumstances: "in line with such
reasoning, it would seem to be virtually impossible to conclude that any weapon is
prohibited per se.”).
209. See Breitegger, supra note 28, at 13 (noting that untrained civilians would
be in danger if they handled hidden cluster bombs that remained and that such
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As one scholar rightly noted: “The dud cluster bomb is virtually
identical to an unmarked and unmapped mine without [a] modern
self-destruct mechanism[].”210
Nevertheless, even in the absence of customary prohibitions on
CMs, non-CCM member or signatory states employing this weapon
are still obligated by the customary rule of proportionality to take all
necessary steps to prevent CMs from indiscriminately causing
civilian casualties.211 As such, a crucial practical issue is CMs’ postconflict effects on the proportionality probe, which balances military
advantage with civilian impact.212
According to Article 51(5)(b) of AP I which reflects customary
IHL, an attack is disproportionate and thus indiscriminate if it “may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”213 While it is understandable that incidental
types of bombings represent the antithesis of trying to require distinguishing
military and civilian objectives).
210. McDonnell, supra note 148, at 80; see PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 129, ¶
1959 (requiring that mines laid by aircraft or remote-delivery have recorded
locations or self-destruct mechanisms); accord BOTHE ET AL., supra note 207, at
308 (explaining that modern remotely delivered mines have self-destruct
mechanisms so they are not indiscriminate as to time but that obsolete mines that
cause casualties may still exist that are indiscriminate as to time).
211. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims in an International Armed Conflict (Protocol
I) Art. 48, 51(4)-(8), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]
(requiring use of force that is not indiscriminate and that is limited to legitimate
military objectives).
212. See Breitegger, supra note 28, at 38 (concluding that there is a need for
states to address long-term civilian losses instead of just short-term losses due to
the impact of cluster munitions).
213. Protocol I, supra note 216, art. 51(5)(b). The proportionality standard is
also reiterated in reiterated in Article 57(2)(a)(iii). See id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii); see also
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 129, ¶¶ 1967-81 (discussing the types of attacks that
this article contemplated: (1) area bombardment, and (2) those with “excessive
effects in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”);
JUDITH GARDEM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 59-84 (2004) (advocating for more legal criteria that bans weapons in the
interest of international humanitarian law); see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS &
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 30613 (2005) (describing specific examples of states that have incorporated customary
international humanitarian law into their domestic law and military manuals).
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civilian losses must be reasonably foreseeable, the debate remains
unresolved as to whether only immediate and short-term civilian
losses can be reasonably foreseeable without being able to predict
long-term civilian harm.214
In light of the unresolved character of the debate, the MAG’s view
was all but an “extended interpretation.”215 On the contrary, it reflects
a stance that the ICRC defined as outdated in light of the experience
gained from the use of CMs and the research conducted into their
effects.216 As Prof. Christopher Greenwood stated prior to the 2006
War:
If . . . cluster weapons are used against military targets in an
area where there are known to be civilians, then the
proportionality test may require that account be taken both of
the risk to the civilians from sub-munitions exploding during
the attack and of the risk from unexploded sub-munitions in
the hours immediately after the attack. It is an entirely
different matter, however, to require that account be taken of
the longer-term risk posed by ERW, particularly of the risk
which ERW can pose after a conflict has ended or after
civilians have returned to an area from which they had
fled. . . . The proportionality test has to be applied on the
basis of information reasonably available at the time of the
attack. The risks posed by ERW once the immediate
aftermath of an attack has passed are too remote to be capable
of assessment at that time.217

214. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century
Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 168 (1999) (arguing that that the
debate reflects a change in emphasis as the proportionality test has always included
after-effects; yet, in the past, only direct effects came to the fore of the discussion).
215. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498.
216. See GGE-CCW, Aug. 2-12, 2005, Existing Principles and Rules of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Munitions that May Become
Explosive Remnants of War, at ¶ 20, CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.7 (July 28, 2005)
[hereinafter GGE-CCW Existing Principles] (adopting the view that using the rule
of proportionality during planning an attack must include an evaluation of
foreseeable incidental consequences and the short- and long-term effects of
submunitions that become Explosive Remnants of War).
217. Christopher Greenwood, GGE-CCW, May 21-24, 2002, Legal Issues
Regarding Explosive Remnants of War, at ¶ 23, CCW/GGE/I/WP.10 (May 23,
2002) (emphasis added) (observing that, "The degree of that risk turns on too many
factors which are incapable of assessment at the time of the attack, such as when
and whether civilians will be permitted to return to an area, what steps the party
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However, given the fact that neither the pertinent AP I articles nor
their history establish any time frame, a growing camp (including
states,218 the ICRC,219 legal experts,220 former military personnel221
and NGOs222 basing their opinions on research conducted in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia on the CM’s long-term impacts on
civilians)223 takes the opposite view.224 Finding support in other
controlling that area will have taken to clear unexploded ordnance, what priority
that party gives to the protection of civilians and so forth”); see also GGE-CCW,
Mar. 6-10, 2007, Report on States Parties’ Responses to the Questionnaire on
International Humanitarian Law & Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2.
Dated
8
March
2005,
at
¶
27,
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.12 (Mar. 24, 2006) (reporting that, based on a
questionnaire, few states have thought about how the proportionality principle can
apply to ERWs).
218. See MCCORMACK & MTHARU, supra note 187, at 1 (finding that 97% of
States consider the rule on proportionality relevant with regards to ERW but that a
more controversial issue is “whether a military commander is required to consider .
. . longer term harm caused to . . . civilian population[s] . . . as a result of” the
proportionality-ERW analysis).
219. See GGE-CCW Existing Principles, supra note 216, ¶ 21 (rejecting the
view that the long term effects of ERW’s proportionality requirement are “not
reasonably foreseeable to a military commander.”).
220. See, e.g., GGE-CCW, Aug. 2-12, 2005, International Humanitarian Law
Principles and Explosive Remnants of War, at 1 n.1, CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.19
(Aug. 25, 2005) (confirming the view of Professor Tim McCormack, who agrees
with imposing requirements for officials to comply with proportionality when
using weapons that result in ERW); McDonnell, supra note 148, at 80 (pointing
out that civilians have often been the main victims of dud cluster bombs because of
their attractive color and size); Wiebe, supra note 152, at 88 (advocating for
regulation of cluster munitions due to the devastation of NATO’s use of CM’s in
Serbia and Kosovo); Breitegger, supra note 28, at 17 (asserting that post-conflict
ERW’s have an impact on civilian populations because casualties happen during
ordinary activities such as farming, and not just direct handling of the munitions).
221. See, e.g., Herthel, supra note 30, at 268 (confirming Major Thomas J.
Herthel’s view that military personnel should avoid the use thereof near populated
areas unless there is a “direct military benefit that clearly outweighs the likely
collateral damage . . . during and after the conflict”).
222. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Watch, Cluster Munitions and the Proportionality Test:
Memorandum to Delegates of the Convention on Conventional Weapons 13 (April
2008) (proposing a legal instrument that bans “the production, transfer,
stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions” due to their victimizing of civilians even
after hostilities are over).
223. See, e.g., HANDICAP INT’L, FATAL FOOTPRINT: THE GLOBAL HUMAN
IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 44-45 (2006) (noting that
those long-term consequences include killed and maimed civilians, particularly
children, which inhibited socio-economic recovery and created a resurgence of
internal displaced persons and refugees); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING
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international weapons instruments concerned with long-term impacts
as well as the 1996 nuclear weapons case (in which few justices
addressed long-term impacts), its supporters declared that: “Most in
the international community now believe that the proportionality
principle requires consideration of the aftereffects of a weapon, such
as a cluster munition . . . . “225
Given this state of affairs, when the Winograd Commission stated
that “the most important issue at hand: the use of CMs must also take
into account the injuries caused by duds, long after the actual firing,
and in some cases even after the end of the war,” 226 it significantly
contributed to the case for the CCM or, at least, to formulating a
prohibition against the use of CMs in and near populated areas. The
Commission had, in effect, defined any CM strike on a populated
area as indiscriminate under IHL.227 Given Israel’s position as a
prominent CM weapons producer (60 million M-85 bomblets by
2002 in addition to license agreements with companies across the
globe), exporter (through artillery shells)228 and, most importantly, a
heavy user (notably in 1973, 1978, 1982, and 2006), such a statement
from an official commission should not be underestimated.

SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 49-82 (exposing the fact that many civilians
returned to their homes in Lebanon after hostilities ended, unaware of submunition
duds that were in their vicinity).
224. See Breitegger, supra note 28, at 14-19 (discussing the debate over whether
long-term effects should be required to be taken into account as one that is about
the subjective assessment of expected civilian losses and not actual civilian losses).
225. HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS, supra note 227, at 12 (noting
that the number of authorities who support this position is growing and that they
contend that the use of CM’s in populated areas can almost always be expected to
cause civilian losses that are “excessive in relation to the . . . military advantage
anticipated).
226. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 495 (emphasis in original).
227. See Responses to Questionnaire, supra note 222, at 19 (explaining that the
exception is in cases when the military, which should bear the burden of proof, is
able to show that the military advantage of this particular strike outweighed the
civilian harm). As one response to the 2005-2006 survey stated: "The greater the
importance of the military target, the greater the collateral damage allowed.” Id.
228. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 27
(naming Israel as a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions through Israel
Military Industries (“IMI”), which is a government-owned weapons manufacturer).
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CONCLUSION
Above all, the 2006 Israeli use of CMs suggests that IHL’s general
principles are inadequate per se at preventing improper use of the
weapon.229 Hence, a shift of attention is required away from the
weapon’s effects (primarily disproportionate civilian casualties)
toward the weapon itself, as the CCM does. Nothing more is needed
than Israel’s insistence, justified or not, that CM use in the Second
Lebanon War generally accorded with IHL to indicate that the
existing law demands urgent remedy. Considering the number of
possessor states that adopted the CCM by May 2008, the fact
remains that some forty states possessing CMs still prefer to remain
outside the purview of the Convention; as such, those states are
bound solely by the general principles of IHL, and future improper
massive use of CMs might be just a matter of time.230
Yet, a treaty over this specific weapon has existed since December
2008.231 Although the issue of when it will enter into force is still an
open question, the issue currently on the agenda is not whether
specific rules on CMs should be devised to remedy the existing law
but, rather, whether an absolute ban on use, possession, and so forth
was needed.232 Could use restrictions fill the gaps in existing law, as
the United States claims?
Within this more limited framework, the 2006 case seems to
support the ban model for three fundamental reasons going beyond
the various shortcomings in the CM Draft Protocol addressed in this
article. After all, some of the flaws in the current draft, important as
they are, could be eliminated to some extent. It is also quite possible
229. Cf. id. at 24-25, 129-30 (concluding that use of cluster munitions binds
states to minimize civilian harm, and that while Israel had made efforts to do so, it
is still responsible for the suffering that it caused).
230. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITION INFORMATION CHART (2009),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/17/cluster-munitioninformation-chart (naming countries, such as Iraq and Syria, that use cluster
weapons but are not parties to the treaty and thus not subject to the treaty’s specific
principles).
231. See States Adopting the Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 1
(reporting that 107 countries adopted the convention on May 30, 2008).
232. See Suzanne Tice, Cluster Munitions: The Ban Process, J. OF MINE
ACTION, Summer 2008, available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/12.1/sp/tice/
tice.htm (summarizing the efforts to ban CMs and noting that certain countries
wanted to have exceptions to the ban).
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that the draft may not obtain the required consensus and be removed
from the CCW agenda.233 In that case, however, the CCM opponents’
contention that a total ban is an extreme measure compared to the
previous restrictions (which allegedly could have allowed them to
join while simultaneously addressing the respective humanitarian
concerns) will gain much attention. Thus, the question becomes
whether a modest model such as that embodied in Protocol III of the
CCW on Incendiary Weapons (i.e., use of weapons is allowed only
when special protection is given to civilian populations)234 can
properly address future humanitarian crises.
The first and the most important reason for supporting the ban
model embodied in the CCM is that, as Lesson Five indicates, Israel
not only uses CMs, but also that its use of this weapon in the field is
uncontrolled.235 On the one hand, approximately 4,000 rockets hit
Israel’s civilian population, with an average of 100 rockets launched
daily, while on the other, more than 173,000 artillery projectiles and
rockets were fired on South Lebanon, mainly to prevent first
firings.236 Under the circumstances of the Second Lebanon War, one
233. See id. (pointing out that some states, such as the United States and Russia,
will not agree to a strict approach to CMs).
234. See Hays Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 279 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 535, 550 (1990) (tracing the drafting history of the Protocol on Incendiary
Weapons and concluding that there should also be rules for internal armed
conflicts also); see also David P. Fidler, The Use of White Phosphorous Munitions
By U.S. Military Forces in Iraq, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights051206.cfm (citing the international outcry whenever
possible violations arise such as in the case of the U.S. use of phosphorous in
Fallujah and Israel’s use of the same in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip);
UN Accuses Israel Over Phosphorous, BBC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7831424.stm (noting that white phosphorus
sticks to human skin and burns to the bone, causing death or wounds that heal
slowly); Amos Harel, IDF Probes Improper Use of Phosphorous Shells in Gaza
Strip, HAARETZ, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057361.
html (reporting two incidents after a probe of improper phosphorous use: a strike
on a UNRWA school bus that killed 42 Palestinians and a friendly fire event that
killed two soldiers). See also Parks, supra note 249, at 544 (explaining that since
white phosphorus is used extensively for marking and screening purposes, it was
excluded from consideration as an incendiary).
235. HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS, supra note 227, at 13
(concluding that a ban on all cluster munitions would best prevent future violations
of international humanitarian law).
236. Cf. HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 4041 (confirming Israel’s likely use of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.)
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might even retrospectively conclude that this exaggeration was
unavoidable; yet, it was also too extreme to support any of the
offered models.
However, during the war, politicians and IDF commanders alike
were accompanied by an unprecedented number of legal advisers.237
As Israel’s AG Mazuz detailed before the Winograd Commission,
legal advisers from the MAG’s office were present at all military
decision-making forums (e.g., targets and sorties approval),
including the Northern Command, the IAF, the Navy, and the
General Staff.238 In fact, the legal accompaniment reached such a
level that the Winograd Commission itself could not but ask
“whether such an intense level of legal advising in real time is indeed
desirable.”239
Given the fact that the extensive use took place under such
conditions,240 it appears that only the total elimination of CMs can
prevent repetition of such practices in the next intensive conflict
engaged in by CM-possessing states. As long as CMs remain integral
parts of military arsenals, their highly perceived military utility,
despite their gradual ineffectiveness as indicated by the Sixth Lesson
above, legal advisers will labor to approve rather than prevent CM
deployment in populated areas.241
The second reason for supporting the ban model is related to the
1976 Bilateral End-Use Agreement between Israel and the United
States. Due to this agreement, Israel faces severe restrictions on its
237. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498; cf. Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, supra note 204, ¶ 251 (confirming that legal advisors are always present
when the IDF makes decisions).
238. Mazuz to Winograd: IDF Acted in Accordance with International Law,
supra note 96.
239. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 488.
240. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 4041 (documenting Israel’s extensive bombing campaign).
241. See Yotam Feldman & Uri Blau, Consent and Advise, HAARETZ, Feb. 5,
2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1059925.html (reporting
that an officer in the International Law Division, the IDF MAG's Office, was
quoted after the December 2008-January 2009 Cast Lead Operation as saying:
"Our goal is not to fetter the army, but to give it the tools to win in a lawful
manner," and also reporting that Prof. Orna Ben-Naftali even stated: "Today, this
discipline [international law] is utilized only to justify the use of force . . . Instead
of legal advice and international humanitarian law minimizing suffering, they
legitimize the use of force.").
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use of CMs, restrictions which are much more stringent and specific
than the rules entered into the CM Draft Protocol to prevent future
IHL violations.242 While an assessment of the diplomatic
entanglement caused in the wake of the 2006 War is beyond the
scope of this article,243 we can state in a nutshell that one of the
conditions to be met when resorting to U.S.-made CM use is
stipulation of “military, fortified targets.”244
While it is doubtful that Israel’s use of U.S.-made CMs (to be
differentiated from a few cases of improper targeting) did violate the
Agreement’s terms, the crucial fact is that use restrictions, albeit
from a bilateral rather than a multilateral source, did nothing to
prevent the humanitarian crisis.245 There can be little hope, therefore,
242. See GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 3
(providing for the protection of civilians, the civilian population, and civilian
objects). In fact, while even earlier drafts (e.g., July and October 2008), which
contained up to nine paragraphs on IHL, were criticized as "merely regulat[ing] the
weapon and . . . not go[ing] far enough to minimize humanitarian harm," see
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 17, at 4 (reviewing the July
2008 draft), in the latest draft (November 2009), there are only two paragraphs
reiterating IHL. The paragraphs state that in implementing this Protocol, members
which are parties to an armed conflict "shall ensure full compliance" with all
applicable principles and rules of IHL and that nothing in it "shall be interpreted as
detracting from, or otherwise prejudicing," other principles and rules of IHL. GGECCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 3.
243. For a review of the entire affair as well as the agreement's origins, history
and diplomatic crises caused over the use of U.S-made CMs by Israel see Barak,
supra note 93.
244. See Don Oberdorfer, Cluster Bomb Curb Sought in Mideast; U.S. Asks
Israel to Tighten Curbs On Deadly Cluster Bomb Units, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
1978, at A1 (reporting that one of the conditions sought was that field commanders
would not use the weapons without decisions made by politically responsible
superiors); see also David S. Cloud, Inquiry Opened into Israeli Use of U.S.
Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at A1 (describing that the first sales of
weapons occurred in the 1970’s but were never publicly confirmed); RICHARD
MOYES & THOMAS NASH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 9 (Simon Conway
ed., 2005) (summarizing the conditions imposed as: “only for defensive purposes,
against fortified military targets, and only if attacked by two or more ‘Arab
states.’”).
245. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 17
(urging the United States to stop supplying most of the cluster munitions and other
weapons that Israel used in Lebanon due to the civilian casualties); see also Mark
Tran, US Studies Israel’s Cluster Bomb Use in Lebanon, GUARDIAN, Jan. 29,
2007,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/29/israelandthepalestinians.usa (noting
that the United States had begun an investigation into whether Israel had violated
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that a different restriction model coming from within or outside the
CCW framework will have greater effect on Israel should it join (and
certainly should it abstain from joining) a would-be protocol on
CMs.
The third, somewhat less urgent reason refers to an argument
commonly used by CCM supporters: the concern that CM
proliferation beyond current possessor states will “include . . . nonstate actors.”246 Moreover, as one CMC co-chair stated, if even a
small portion of the billions of sub-munitions currently in world
arsenals get used, “they could make the landmine crisis pale in
comparison.”247 In this respect, the Second Lebanon War proved that
such proliferation is already here: Although not addressed by the
current article, there is conclusive evidence of CM use248 by
Hezbollah during the war.249 Hezbollah’s use, which inflicted one
usage agreements while using the cluster bombs in 2006).
246. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, STAYING TRUE TO THE BAN ON CLUSTER
MUNITIONS 5 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/22/stay
ing-true-ban-cluster-munitions (advocating broad language in international law
that prevents states or companies from assisting non-state actors from acquiring aid
for CM’s or using them).
247. Steve Goose, Dir., Arms Div., Hum. Rts. Watch, Cluster Munitions:
Statement to the Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International
Development
(Mar.
1,
2007),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/03/01/cluster-munitions-statement-canadianstanding-committee-foreign-affairs-and-internat (“We believe that the military
utility of cluster munitions has been overstated while the military dangers . . . have
been understated.”).
248. See Press Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, Lebanon/Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel
with Cluster Munitions During Conflict, Oct. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/10/18/lebanonisrael-hezbollah-hit-israel-clustermunitions-during-conflict (documenting Hezbollah’s use of 118 Chinese-made
Type-81 122mm unguided rockets containing 39 bomblets each. These bomblets
(called Type-90s or MZDs) are dual-purpose: Once they explode on impact for a
blast effect, they fragment into hundreds of steel spheres about 3.5 mm in diameter
over a wide area. [A reliable HDR for these bomblets is unavailable]); see also
Mine Action Info. Ctr. at James Madison Univ., Munitions Reference,
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/supplemental/munitions/munitions.asp (last visited
May 14, 2010) (providing lists of different types of weapons and their functions).
249. See, e.g., Press Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 252. (noting that the
Israeli government was reluctant to confirm Hezbollah CM attacks because of
security concerns); see also Hezbollah Used Cluster Bombs, Groups Asserts, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at A10 (citing the Human Rights Watch report on
Hezbollah’s CM use and reporting that three civilians were injured in a particular
attack in July near Maghar).
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death and twelve injuries in Israel, provides an additional incentive
to ban CMs or, at least impose heavy restrictions on their transfer.250
Indeed, historically, banning a weapon has not guaranteed its total
destruction.251 Regardless of the intrusiveness of the legal instrument
applied, states can always develop and/or maintain a hidden
arsenal.252 Banning does ensure, however, that the banned weapon is,
at minimum, outside the reach of regular combat units when a bitter
conflict erupts, making it impossible for the alleged arsenal to be
used other than as a last resort.
As to those states deciding to refrain from joining the CCM, its
very existence may strongly reinforce or generate an international
norm prohibiting CMs. Through de-legitimization, that norm will
affect non-CCM members before they resort to large-scale use of
CMs, especially against targets in populated areas. The constructivist
literature has already demonstrated (for example, in reference to
chemical weapons and anti-personnel landmines) that international
treaties, or even deliberation about international treaties, on some
categories of weapons can result in their stigmatization.253
250. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CIVILIANS UNDER ASSAULT: HEZBOLLAH’S
ROCKET ATTACKS ON ISRAEL IN THE 2006 WAR 44-46 (Aug. 2007) (providing that
the death and 12 injuries are confirmed through police reports along with police
reports confirming bombs landing in Haifa); Alia Ibrahim, Report Accuses
Hezbollah of Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in ‘06 War, WASH. POST, Aug.
30, 2007, at A15 (reporting that Hezbollah and the Lebanese government strongly
condemned the Human Rights Watch report.) Due to the attention devoted to
Israeli use of CMs, the implications of Hezbollah’s use were almost totally
ignored.
251. See CCM, supra note 2, art. 3(6) (permitting possession of a limited
number of CMs and explosive sub-munitions for the development of and training
in CM and explosive sub-munition detection, clearance, or destruction, and
development of CM counter-measures).
252. See, e.g., Ken Alibek & Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling
Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World-Told from
the Inside By the Man Who Ran It (1999) (considering the Iraqi case regarding
nuclear weapons and the Soviet case regarding biological weapons and remarking,
"[o]ver a twenty-year period that began, ironically, with Moscow's endorsement of
the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] in 1972, the Soviet Union [one of the
three BWC depository states] built the largest and most advanced biological
warfare establishment in the world.").
253. See Richard Price & Nina Tannenwald, Norms and Deterrence: The
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 114-52 (Peter J. Katzenstein
ed., 1996) (providing a succinct analysis of the chemical weapons case and
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CCM supporters have openly stated that they hope that such
stigmatization will occur with CMs.254 In 1996, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), while
reviewing a case in which CM rockets (Orkan M-87)255 were fired
into Zagreb, noted that there was nothing in IHL formally forbidding
the use of CMs as such.256 A decade later, many states still perceive
CMs as legitimate although the winds have changed.257 As the AP
mines case (which inspired the participants of the Oslo Process)
indicates, delegitimization will eventually occur.258 In a move which

commenting that the most important effect of international taboos is that they
delegitimize weapons and the practice of self-help); Richard Price, Reversing the
Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 INT’L ORGS. 613,
640 (1998) (analyzing the process prior to the entry into force of the treaty on AP
landmines and concluding that new norms regarding landmines are likely to affect
policymakers’ decisions); BRIAN RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND THE
CONVENTION: STIGMA, HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS AND THE OSLO PROCESS 8-9
(Richard Moyes ed., 2008) [hereinafter RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND THE
CONVENTION] (summarizing the recent studies on this case and explaining that delegitimization helps countries make progress regarding regulation of landmines
even if they are not state parties to any Conventions).
254. See Minister Micheál Martin, Statement at Closing Ceremony of the Dublin
Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions (May 30, 2008), available at
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/Ireland.pdf (“[E]even though we all
know that there are important states not present, I am also convinced that together
we will have succeeded in stigmatizing any future use of cluster munitions.”).
255. See JANE’S AMMUNITION HANDBOOK 660 (Anthony G. Williams & Leland
Ness eds., 14th ed. 2006) (providing weapon specifications).
256. See Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Decision, ¶ 18
(Mar. 8, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe11/R61/960308IT.htm
(finding, however, that the specific rocket used was an indiscriminate weapon;
Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 463, 468 (June 12,
2007), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/martic/trialc/judgement/martcjud070612e.pdf (holding that Martić, the former political leader of Croatian
Serbs, ordered, inter alia, the shelling of Zagreb on May 2-3, 1995.); see also
Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Public Judgment, ¶ 252 (Oct. 8,
2008), available at http://www.un.org/icty/martic/appeal/ judgment/maraj081008e.pdf (dismissing the appeal and confirming the sentence while sustaining
the Trial Chamber's finding that the M-87 Orkan—as used under the circumstances
of the case—was an indiscriminate weapon and that Martić knew of the effects of
this weapon when he ordered the shelling).
257. See Tice, supra note 232 (reporting that the United States and Russia have
historically been opposed to banning cluster bombs although they seem to be
leaning towards favoring regulation).
258. See Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008,
at 11 (commenting on the U.S. administration’s opposition to the CCM but also
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bears important implications for the current debate over the
weapons’ legitimacy, Hezbollah Lebanese MP Hassan Hoballah,
although refusing to address specific queries regarding whether
Hezbollah indeed used CMs, stated in an interview with the BBC
that: “We did not use these bombs . . . [w]e reject the use of these
bombs anywhere in the world because they hurt civilians, especially
when dropped on residential areas. Our stance is consistent. It can
never change.”259
This development has not been overlooked by CCM
opponents260 and—as many supporters believe—provides an
important impetus to concluding the Draft Protocol. Yet, while the
CCM seeks to delegitimize this weapon, the would-be effect of the
Draft Protocol is exactly diametrical.261 This is the core of the
dispute. In light of the perceived effectiveness of the CM (especially
in comparison with the one attributed to AP landmines) a prolonged
battle is expected. As the Head of the U.S. delegation assiduously
clarified during the November 2008 session of the GGE on CMs:
“Again, let me be perfectly clear here, on the 4th of December, after
the signing ceremony of Oslo, cluster munitions will still remain as
lawful and legitimate weapons.”262
Finally, it is hard to find more favorable circumstances for
responsible use of CMs than a professionally trained and modern

saying, "At least this treaty, like the land-mine ban, will stigmatize cluster
munitions and make it harder to use them"); RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND
THE CONVENTION, supra note 253, at 3 (mentioning NATO’s policy of no-use of
CMs in Afghanistan as evidence of other efforts made to avoid CM usage); Borrie,
supra note 7, (using Brazil’s review of its national positions with a view to joining
the CCM as an example of progress).
259. Hezbollah Denies Cluster Bomb Use, BBC NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 6068154.stm; see HUM. RTS. WATCH,
CLUSTER BOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BACKGROUNDER 2
(Oct. 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/10/31/cluster-bombsafghanistan (pointing out that the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the Serb
militia in Croatia, see supra note 258, have used CMs as well.)
260. See Peter Beaumont, Obama Takes U.S. Closer to Total Ban on Cluster
Bombs, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/mar/13/us-national-security-obama-administration/print (noting that
Obama signed a new law making it virtually impossible to sell the weapons).
261. See id. (stating that the United States will still continue to use cluster
weapons even though Obama had seemingly made progress on its ban).
262. Mathias, supra note 54.
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army that has legal advisors, knowledgeable in IHL and weighing in
on each relevant decision. In fact, as AG Mazuz stated before the
Winograd Commission: “It was the most legislated war in the history
of Israel, maybe the world.”263 If a loss of control transpired even in
such favorable circumstances, it seems that no country is to be
trusted with the proper use of CMs once it becomes involved in a
bitter military conflict. The failure of Israel’s intensive legal control
of military operations during the Second Lebanon War to provide
adequate protection to Lebanese civilians should warn us that many
more cases of severe post-conflict civilian harm will occur in the
absence of strong, viable use prohibition. However, these will
probably, as the Sixth Lesson on the ineffectiveness of CMs in this
War suggests above, be of no avail whatsoever.

263. Mazuz to Winograd: IDF Acted in Accordance with International Law,
supra note 96; see Yuval Azoulay, Mazuz: Ample Legal Advice During War,
HAARETZ, Oct. 17, 2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.
jhtml?itemNo=936011 (asserting that there was enough legal advice in officers’
deliberations before military operations).

